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I. INTRODUCTION
Controversy about insurance classification often pits one group of insureds
against another. Women charge that they pay too much for individual health and
disability insurance and annunities. 1 They are told that for them to pay less, men will
have to pay more and that the benefits derived by eliminating sex classification will
be far outweighed by higher premiums for women in automobile and life insurance. 2
1. For a summary of the differences in treatment of men and women in insurance, see Wortham, Insurance
Classification: Toolmportantto beLeft to theActuaries, 19 U. Mien. J.L. REro t 349, 375-77 (1986). Women also have
complained that the more favorable rates they receive in life and automobile insurance are not commensurate with their
statistical advantage. Id.
In Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), and Ariz. Governing Comm. v. Norris,
463 U.S. 1073 (1983), the Supreme Court considered whether women making higher contributions or receiving lower
benefits from an employer-sponsored annuity plan violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2000e- 17 (1982). The major share of the legal commentary on insurance classification concerns Manhart, Norris,
and the issues raised in those cases. For citations to thirty such articles, comments, and notes, see Wortham, supra at 356
n.31.
Identical bills to ban classification based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin in all lines of insurance were
introduced by Senator Hatfield and Representative Dingell in the 96th Congress and revised versions were introduced in
subsequent Congresses. H.R. 1793, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 2204, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2477, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 6536-39 (1980); H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); H.R. 100, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); H.R. 100, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
Five sets of extensive hearings have been held on these bills. Two of these were chaired by Senator Packwood, whose
name also has come to be associated with the bill. Fair Insurance Practices Act: Hearings on S. 372 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings
on S. 372, 98th Cong.]; Fair Insurance Practices Act: Hearings on S. 2204 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on S. 2204, 97th Cong.];
Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 2477 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on S.
2477, 96th Cong.]; Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 100 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., Ist Seas. (1983)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings on H.R. 100, 98th Cong.]; Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act of 1981: Hearings
on H.R. 100 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on H.R. 100, 97th Cong.].
Most of the controversy about these proposals has been over gender. At a hearing in 1983, Senator Packwood
commented that the ban on gender was the only one that seemed of concern to insurers. Senate Hearings on S. 372, 98th
Cong., supra, at 323.
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, chaired by Senator Packwood, reported the bill
in the 97th Congress. S. Rep. No. 671, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
chaired by Congressman Dingell, reported the bill in the 98th Congress, but amendments so emasculated it that its
supporters abandoned it. Opponents Rewrite Unisex Insurance Bill, Co.o. Q., March 31, 1984 at 706, 707.
The bill's text also has appeared as Title III of a proposed "Economic Equity Act," an omnibus bill of proposals
addressed to sex equity in the past three Congresses. S. 1169, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2472, 99th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1985); S. 288, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2090, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); S. 888, 97th Cong., 1st
Seas. (1981); H.R. 2090, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
Four states ban gender classification in automobile insurance, thus benefiting men as a group. HAw. REv. STAT. §
294-33 (1976); MAss. GEN. Laws ANN. ch. 175, §§ 22E, 24A (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); Micu. COMp. Laws Ames. §
500.2027(c) (West 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-303 (1982 & Supp. 1985). Only one state bans gender classification in
all lines of insurance. Mor. CoD ANN. § 49-2-309 (1985).
2. For examples of such arguments by representatives of insurance companies and trade groups, see Senate
Hearings on S. 372, 98th Cong., supra note 1, at 303-08, 312, 314-16. Citations to articles on gender classification in
automobile insurance can be found in Wortham, supra note 1, at 357 n.32.
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Those afflicted with particular diseases or genetic traits call for protection
against insurers' use of these characteristics to deny insurance or elevate its cost.3
They are told that it would be unfair for other insureds to subsidize these unlucky
people regardless of how dire their need for insurance and regardless of whether their
afflictions are beyond their control. 4
Automobile insurance costs young, male, single, urban drivers more-some-
times vastly more-than other insureds.5 Against their rate protests are raised the
picture of the safe, sober, respectable citizens who would have to pay more to
subsidize these risky young men. 6
Blacks charge that rating by residential zip code in property and automobile
insurance is race discrimination. 7 Territorial redlining in property insurance also is
assailed for causing the decline of urban neighborhoods, since one cannot get a
mortgage loan without property insurance. 8 The prospect that citizens in the
3. A recent example in the District of Columbia is controversy over a bill to prohibit life and health insurance
companies from denying coverage for someone who refused to take blood tests that can determine exposure to Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome virus. The proposal also imposes a five year moratorium before a rate differential could
be proposed for such persons. During this period, the D.C. Public Health Commissioner is to decide which if any tests
are reliable. AIDS Bill Adrances, Wash. Post, April 23, 1986 at C5, col. 3. After enactment by the D.C. City Council
and Mayor, the U.S. Senate voted to repeal the provision. 132 Co'.. REc. S10104-10112 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1986). (The
Congress exercises broad legislative jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. U.S. Cossr. art. I § 8, cl. 17.) The
American Council of Life Insurance and the Health Insurance Association of America have sought to enjoin the D.C. law.
Insurance Groups Sue to Block D.C. AIDS Law, Wash. Post, Aug. 6, 1986, at B3, col. 4-6.
For state statutes proscribing classifications based on physical or mental impairment, a specific disability or a genetic
trait, see Wortham, supra note 1, at 367. See Bailey, Hutchison, & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance
Classification, 25 DeRAn L. REv. 779, 795 (1976) (bans on use of genetic defect in rating or underwriting in life
insurance).
Senator Mathias has proposed a federal statute banning blindness as a classification. S. 1290, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1985); S. 2775, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CoNG. Rec. S7646-48 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
4. Commenting on the D.C. proposal to ban exposure to AIDS virus as an insurance classification, Russ luculano,
legislative director of the American Council of Life Insurance Companies, charged that "'Healthy persons will have to pay
an AIDS tax [if passed]." AIDS Bill Advances, supra note 3.
5. Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policy Holders, Part 1: Discrimination by Property and Casualty Insurance
Companies: The Fairness in the Coverage and Cost of Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and
Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-12, (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and Casualty Ins., 95th Cong.]. A 1979 General
Accounting Office study of classification practices gave as examples in Massachusetts, before Insurance Commissioner
Stone's ordered changes, a 24-year-old male driver with no accidents living in East Boston who would have to pay $2,512
for car insurance on a three-year-old Chevrolet Malibu and an elderly resident of Deerfield, Massachusetts who would pay
$160 for the same car and same coverages even if the Deerfield man had had two accidents in the previous year. U.S.
GENaLa AccoUtsI OFsicE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS By THE Co.% rnouER GeaiRAL: IssuEs AN NEEDE I.Rovaturrs IN STATE
REsr.AT.io- or THE INsuRsAsc Buscmss 104, 113 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GAO REP.]. For citations to articles on gender
and territorial classification, see Wortham, supra note 1, at 357 n.32.
6. See Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and Casualty Ins., 95th Cong., supra note 5, at
157-67 (testimony by a representative of a property-casualty trade association). In recent testimony before the House
Judiciary Committee, former Representative Robert McClory commented on allegations that current classification unfairly
discriminates against consumers such as city residents and male motorists aged 18 to 25: "As a senior citizen and a non
drinker with a good safety record I am personally alarmed at the prospect of. . . [proposals] . . . which would require
me to subsidize the high risk motorist who gets behind the wheel." Competition in the Insurance Industry: Oversight
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 27, 29 (1984) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong.).
7. Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire and Casualty Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979). For five
studies of territorial classification and its effects, see Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and
Casualty Ins., 95th Cong., supra note 5, at 223-351, 352-409, 410-51, 452-87, 634-48.
8. MEETING THE INssURNcE CRIsIS oF OUR CIms: A REPORT BY THE PREssmrNr's NATIONAL ADviSORY PANEL ON INSURANCE
IN RioT-A-FEcTED AREAS 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as HUaHES PAN'EL REP.]; Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination
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countryside and suburban areas would pay more if insureds were pooled more broadly
is invoked against proposals to restrict insurers' discretion to classify by neighbor-
hoods. 9
Controversy about such classifications has raged in state insurance commissions,
state legislatures, the Congress, and state and federal courts.10 Casting of one group
of insureds against another portrays insurance as fitting the economic theory model
of the zero-sum game, with one insured gaining only at the expense of another."I This
divides insurance consumers against one another. It also deflects attention from the
way classification is practiced and regulated, and from the losses that may fall on
third parties when people are uninsured or inadequately insured, the external costs
that diminish society's wealth.
In an earlier article, I questioned the fairness of the status quo in insurance
classification and its regulation and challenged the claim of insurers and most
regulators that classification is a neutral, scientific process based on statistical
differences.' 2 I also disputed the contention that refined classifications are encour-
aged or required by state law.13
Here I turn to the validity of economic analyses of refined classification for the
personal lines of insurance generally purchased by individuals: automobile,
homeowner's, renter's, health, life, and disability insurance. 14 My conclusions differ
from much of what has appeared recently in writings on classification in law reviews
and public policy journals. ' 5
in Property and Casualty Ins., 95th Cong., supra note 5, at 31-34. Citations to articles on territorial classification can
be found in Wortham, supra note 1, at 357 n.32.
Senator Metzenbaum introduced a bill in 1980 that would limit rate differentials based on territory in property and
automobile insurance while also banning the use of marital status, personal living habits, appearance, marital history,
political activities, and in some instances, occupation. The Insurance Competition Improvement Act, S. 2474, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoN. Rec. 6529-36 (1980) [hereinafter cited as S. 2474, 96th Cong.]. Testimony on the bill can
be found in Insurance Competition Improvement Act, S.2474, Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopoly and Business Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d. Seas. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings on S. 2474].
9. Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and Casualty Ins., 95th Cong., supra note 5, at
170-74.
10. Wortham, supra note 1, at 354-58 (overview of controversial classifications and areas where controversy has
raged); supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
11. Benston, Discrimination and Economic Efficiency in Employee Fringe Benefits: A Clarification of Issues and
a Response to Professors Brilmayer, Laycock, and Sullivan, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 250, 273 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Benston 1i] uses the phrase: "Neither the Supreme Court nor the Brilmayer group appears to recognize that annuities and
insurance generally are zero-sum games. All of the premiums collected, plus earnings from invested funds, less
administrative expenses and reserves for contingencies, are paid to the policy holders." (Emphasis added). Benston, The
Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 489 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Benston 1] lays the groundwork for this approach. For elaboration on the zero-sum framework, see
infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. For my critique, see infra notes 412-13 and accompanying text.
12. Wortham, supra note 1, at 370-81.
13. Wortham, supra note 1, at 381-93.
14. See infra notes 75-121 and accompanying text for background on these lines: structure of the industry,
coverage, sales methods, common classifications and regulation.
15. The characterization of insurance as a zero-sum game appears in Benston II, supra note 11, at 273. See supra
note 11 and infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text for further explanation of Benston's assertion, and infra notes
412-13 and accompanying text for my critique.
Benston also states that the use of any classification for which benefits to a subgroup exceed administrative cost
promotes efficiency. Benston I, supra note 11, at 497-98. See infra note 182 and accompanying text for further
explanation and infra notes 364-69 and accompanying text for my critique.
A third argument of Benston's, addressed by this Article, is that an economic definition of present value should be
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used to define discrimination when insurance is involved. Benston I, supra note 11, at 497-98. Three articles by Richard
Miller make the same argument: Miller, Discrimination by Gender in Automobile Insurance: A Note on Hartford Accident
and Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 23 DvQ. L. REv. 621 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Miller, Discrimination
by Gender]; Miller, How to Discriminate by Sex: Federal Regulation of the Insurance Industry, 17 CONN. L. REv. 567
(1985); Miller, Gender Based Mortality Tables and the Insurance Industry: Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United
States, 18 CONN. L. REv. 393 (1986). For further explanation of the argument, see infra notes 190-96 and accompanying
text. For my critique, see infra notes 385-87 and accompanying text. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart,
1979 A... B. FousND REs. J. 83, 106-08 (1979), makes a similar point without putting it into economic language.
Brilmayer, Laycock & Sullivan, The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor
Benston, 50 U. Cm. L. Rev. 222, 223 (1983) argues that Benston adds nothing to Kimball. See Benston commenting on
Kimball, Benston 1, supra note 11, at 501-02.
Benston alludes to insureds paying a "'fair share," Benston 1, supra note 11, at 498, but that is a moral concept rather
than an economic one. See Williams, Unfair Rate Discrimination in Property and Liability Insurance, in Iusut.ANcE,
Goeeo.mNTr, ,aN SoctI Poucy 209, 239-40 (S. Kimball and H. Denenberg eds. 1969) (concluding that the notion of
unfair discrimination in insurance rate classification is a moral concept with no strong economic arguments in support).
Benston also spends considerable time in his articles on the arguments that prohibition of sex classification in
employee fringe benefits will hurt women in the job market. Benston I, supra note 11, at 532-41. In doing so, he was
responding to Key, Sex-Based Pension Plans in Perspective: City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 2 HAev. Wo'.aN's L.J. 1 (1979). See infra note 143 for a brief description of those arguments, but they are not
dealt with substantively in this Article.
Kenneth Abraham recently published an excellent book offering a much needed conceptual framework for insurance
law generally. K. ABRAHAe'., DismBurnsG RIsK: IsukxcE, LEoA. TUEORY, Ao PUBuc Poucv (1986) [hereinafter cited as K.
ABRAtmsil. He sees promotion of economic efficiency as one of the three principal purposes that insurance law does, and
should, serve. Id. at 9-18. (The other two are fair distribution of risk and promoting equitable relations between insurers
and insureds.) Id. at 18-36. Chapter IV of the book appeared previously as Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in
Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REv. 403 (1985). There and elsewhere in the book, Abraham defines the
promotion of economic efficiency by classification in its relation to loss control as giving people incentives to compare
the cost of insurance to the cost of loss reduction and to consider foregoing risky activities. K. ABRAHA.m at 65-66, 77-78.
Efficiency is promoted by accurate risk classification because the sum of the costs of insurance and loss prevention may
be reduced, id. at 11, and resources will be allocated optimally to insurance and to loss prevention, id. at 12. If insurance
is overpriced, people will devote too many resources to loss prevention or savings against loss and be unable to satisfy
their desire to avert risk. If insurance is underpriced, people may buy more insurance and skimp on loss prevention. The
existence of insurance may encourage them to take less care. Id. at 15. Because the reality of risk classification is so far
from the ideal of perfect information, I find the conclusions on optimal allocation and moral hazard to have limited force.
See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text on Abraham's analysis and infra notes 370-72 and accompanying text for
my critique. Promotion of loss control is a sensible criterion for approval of a classification's use, but I propose some
additional factors to be considered. See infra notes 148-49, 181 and accompanying text on Abraham's analysis and infra
notes 351-63 and accompanying text for my comments.
Abraham presents economic efficiency as one purpose that appropriately may yield to other purposes in some
circumstances. He shares my concern for availability, but phrases it in terms of promotion of equality as a value. K.
ABRAH&%t at 29-31.
Four faculty members at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania summarize recent works from
economics scholarly journals on the workings of the insurance market in D. CTsisNs, B. S.%m, N. VANCE, & J.
VADEtui, Ris CLASSIFCAT1ON IN Lwe IssANce 27-62 (1983). [hereinafter cited as D. Cummins] They characterize
instability and eventual failure of voluntary insurance markets when rating does not reflect the degree of risk presented
by insureds as 'the economic rationale for risk classification." Id. at 27. For further explanation of this analysis, see infra
notes 152-80, 189 and accompanying text. For my criticism, see infra notes 373-84 and accompanying text.
Stewart Kemp, a former counsel to Senator Metzenbaum's subcommittee which considered the Insurance
Competition Improvement Act, and now an official in the Massachusetts Department of Insurance, challenges superficial
conclusions about deregulation of insurance as promoting desirable competition based on an analysis of the actual
workings of the insurance market. Kemp, Insurance and Competition, 17 IDAHO L. Rev. 547 (1981). (For information on
Senator Metzenbaum's bill, see supra note 8 and accompanying text).
Three economists writing for interdisciplinary journals have pointed out externalities that arise in insurance and made
useful observations about alternative regulatory mechanisms to address such externalities. Keeton & Kwerel, Externalities
in Automobile Insurance and the Underinsured Driver Problem, 27 J. L. & Eco.. 149 (1984) and Vickrey, Automobile
Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, and Insurance: An Economist's Critique, 33 LAw & Cosresmn. Peoas. 464 (1968).
Works, Whatever's FAIR-Adequacy, Equity, and the Underwvriting Prerogative in Property Insurance Markets, 56
NtB. L. Rev. 445 (1977) generally does not take an economic perspective, but this insightful article does make some points
about the way economic incentives lead insurers to classify and how insurance availability shortages develop in response.
Two student works, Comment, Banning "Actuarially Sound" Discrimination: The Proposed Nondiscrimination in
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But more is at stake than an academic dispute. Explicit and implicit economic
arguments figure prominently in the public debate about what actions federal and
state regulators and legislators should take in regulating classification.16 The
dominant theme in such arguments is that economics is entirely on the side of
unfettered discretion to classify, and that mischief is done when classification
discretion is restricted to achieve social goals.17
Economic reasoning offers little justification for the way insurance classification
actually is practiced in the personal lines. Indeed, it may support some types of
market intervention, if not completely new structures, to provide the functions served
by private insurance. An economic case can be made for a limited group of
classifications that actually promote loss control, but those represent a relatively
small percentage of the classifications used.' 8 Even classifications that seem to
provide incentives for loss control should be scrutinized carefully to see if an actual
reduction in overall losses is likely to result.' 9
Broad conclusions opposing all classification restrictions fail for one or more of
the following reasons. Neoclassical economic models of markets rest on a number of
assumptions that vary widely from the reality of insurance markets. Three premises
that present particular problems are: 1) actors in the market behave as rational utility
maximizers as predicted by expected utility theory; 2) perfect information; 3) no
transaction costs. Empirical evidence and controlled experiments on actual insurance
buying behavior dispute whether people actually behave as predicted by expected
utility theory. 20 Information problems abound in the insurance markets, particularly
the markets for the personal lines. 2' In large part because of the severe information
problems, transaction costs are extremely high. 22
The neoclassicist reasons that competition will pressure price to marginal cost.
For insurance, marginal cost would be the actuarially fair premium based on
classifications of insureds' riskiness. 23 Price competition, however, functions poorly
in many segments of the insurance market. 24
Insurance Act, 20 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 631 (1983), and Note, Norris v. Arizona: A Move Toward Unisex Insurance, 45 Lk.
L. REv. 149 (1984), employ some economic arguments as part of their analyses, but do not add anything necessary to
comment upon in this Article.
16. D-3 ADViSORY Co.smrrrE, PmivA'E PssEtota AuroMosBn. INsua sAsc RATE CtAssmncA-no (1979) [hereinafter cited
as NAIC ADviSORY Co.its. Ra'.] is a lengthy critique by an insurer advisory committee in response to a National
Association of Insurance Commissioners task force report recommending abolition of sex and marital status as
classification variables in private passenger automobile insurance. (The task force report had retreated from an earlier
version recommending the abolition of age as well.) Id. at 7. This insurer advisory committee report refers to pricing at
expected costs as a "fundamental economic principle." Id. at 1.
17. As put by an insurer advisory group, "The American economic system works best when perceived social
concerns are not allowed to preempt economic fact, lest incurable market dislocation result." NAIC ADvSORY CoMM. REP.,
supra note 16, at 4.
18. See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text on the classification process.
19. See infra notes 356-63 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 294-320 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 241-54, 294-332 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 238-332 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 45, 183-88 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 339-48 and accompanying text.
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Most lav and economics writings on insurance classification take the Chicago
School approach, resting on neoclassical analysis. 25 In neoclassical terms, much of
the following can be synthesized to the overall conclusion that the economic
justification for letting market-determined classifications stand unregulated is weak
because there is market failure on both the supply and demand sides.26 A
neoclassicist's prescription for reform often will be initiatives to improve the
functioning of the market.
This Article also analyzes insurance classification from a second approach to law
and economics, the institutionalist or transaction cost approach. Institutionalists focus
on the consequences of imperfect information and bounded rationality-two prob-
lems particularly acute with regard to insurance. Institutionalists go beyond the
market to consider whether there are institutional arrangements that might reduce
transaction costs and discourage opportunistic behavior.2 7
Two of the major arguments about classification made in law reviews-
efficiency is enhanced by use of any classification for which benefits to a subgroup
exceed costs and discrimination should be measured by present value-are misstate-
ments even of neoclassical theory.28 Another limitation on previous analyses is that
most ignore externalities created when people are uninsured or underinsured.2 9
After a background section designed to aid those with limited knowledge of
economic theory about insurance and insurance practices, 30 the third part of this
Article surveys the contentions about the applicability of economic theory to
classification argued in the legal literature and the policy debate up to now. 3 1 Part IV
then points out the shortcomings in that work (along the lines previously described)
and outlines the ways in which economic theory should be taken into account in the
insurance classification debate.3 2 The final section describes some public policy
implications of my views on the economics of classification, both from a neoclassical
and from an institutionalist perspective. 33
25. Perhaps most often associated with the movement is Judge Richard Posner. One of his central works is
Eco.o~uc ANsYs.s oF Lkw (2d ed. 1977). For a description of the assumptions of neoclassical economics and its contrast
to the institutionalist or transaction cost approach, see generally P. BtrRows & C. VuaANovsri, TH E ECONOMIC AEpmOAcH To
Lw 1-34 (1981) and G. Ga,sv, Tn.EBLE DAmAGtE L ANmusT (to be published in 1987).
K. ABRmth, supra note 15, touches on some of the concerns of the institutionalists although his discussion of
economics generally follows a neoclassical framework. He considers economic efficiency as only one possible goal of
insurance law and argues that other values might sometimes supercede it. Id. at 8-41. His book brings not only an
economic perspective but a philosophical one.
Guido Calabresi deals with insurance in some of his works on tort, e.g., THE Cosrs or AcciD=s'rs: A LEGAl. AsND
Ecoso.%uc ANALYstS (1970). His approach focuses on institutionalist concerns.
A professor of decision science, Howard Kunreuther, has written extensively on alternative institutional structures
for disaster insurance. See, e.g., Kunreuther & Slovic, Economics, Psychology, and Protective Behavior, 68 Am. Ecox.
REv. PsaRs A.D PRoc. 64 (1978); Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB. PoL'y 227 (1976).
26. My thanks to Kenneth Abraham for this phrasing.
27. P. BmRrows & C. Vwuxovsm, supra note 25, at 1-34 and G. GARVEY, supra note 25.
28. See infra notes 182, 190-96, 364-69, 385-87 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 333-38 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 33-135 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 136-96 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 197-401 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 402-39 and accompanying text.
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Before turning to these sections on the application of economic theory to
classification, Part II provides background for understanding what follows. For those
readers unfamiliar with relevant areas of economic theory, the first half of Part II
reviews the rationale for the existence of insurance and basic models of insured and
insurer behavior.3 4 For those with a limited background in insurance, the second half
of Part II describes how insurance classification works, 35 addresses the coverage,
sales methods, and regulation extant for the personal lines, 36 and argues for the
essential nature of insurance. 37
It. BACKGROUND FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF INSURANCE CLASSIFICATION
The first subpart that follows reviews expected utility theory, the rock upon
which rests the explanations for insurance as a phenomenon and how it is purchased.
The second subpart explains "moral hazard" and "adverse selection," two concepts
thought to explain much insured and insurer behavior. The third subpart describes
classification and its use in insurance. The fourth subpart provides background on the
personal lines of insurance.The final subpart argues the essential nature of the
personal lines, a conviction that drives many of my policy recommendations.
A. Economic Explanations for Insurance as a Phenomenon
Most economic discussions of insurance invoke expected utility theory as a
model to predict and explain consumer buying behavior, a "positive" analysis .3
Expected utility theory also is used as a normative model'-for rational choice to
explain when insurance should be purchased.3 9
Expected utility theory posits that when people make decisions about uncertain
events they try to maximize expected utility, which is defined as the sum of the
products of the utilities of possible outcomes and the probabilities that each will
occur.40 In another formulation, the axioms of the expected utility model "imply that
the consistent man behaves as if he assigns personal probabilities to different states
of nature, assigns numerical utilities to the results of each possible course of action,
and then chooses the action with the highest expected utility.' '41 The calculation of
utility is based on a consideration of the value of the assets the person will have if the
risky outcome occurs with or without insurance. 42
34. See infra notes 38-63 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 75-121 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 122-35 and accompanying text.
38. For a definition of positive versus normative economics, see infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
39. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 EcoNo.imratcA 263, 263
(1979); Kunreuther, supra note 25, at 228;Slovie, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Corrigan, & Combs, Preference for Insuring
Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK INs. 237, 238 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Slovic].
40. Slovic, supra note 39, at 238.
41. Kunreuther, supra note 25, at 228; see generally Friedman and Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices
Involving Risk, 56 J. PoL. EcoN. 279 (1948) (for history, explanation, and further development of expected utility theory).
42. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 39, at 263-64, refer to this calculation based on difference in total wealth
as asset integration.
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Traditionally it is assumed that most people are risk averse-they would prefer
insurance with a premium x to facing without insurance a loss with expected value
x. 43 Expected value is the mean of the sums of the probability of loss multiplied by
the magnitude in each instance, for example, the mean of the sums of a ninety percent
probability of zero loss plus a ten percent probability of $1000 loss yields an expected
value of $100. 44 If a person behaves according to the axioms of expected utility
theory and is risk averse, he would rather pay $100 for insurance than risk a $1000
loss with a 10 percent probability, a $500 loss with a 20 percent probability, or a $200
loss with a 50 percent probability. The expected value is considered to be the
actuarially fair premium. 45
Expected utility theory predicts that a risk averter always will choose to buy
insurance at actuarially fair rates. 46 Actuarially fair premiums are "loaded" with a
factor for administrative cost.47 It is predicted that insureds still will want to buy this
loaded actuarially "unfair" policy so long as it is not too unfair. 48 Because fixed
administrative costs increase the cost most on first dollar coverage, making it most
actuarially unfair, it is posited that insureds will prefer, and the optimum coverage
will be, full coverage above a deductible amount. 49
Expected utility theory provides a basis for the case that insurance provides
societal benefits. 50 Risk averting behavior may reflect the stability and psychological
security insurance can provide. For the personal lines of insurance, it means
alleviating the fear that liability from an automobile or property related accident will
bring financial ruin at worst or troublesome litigation costs at best. Automobile and
homeowner's insurance also ensure there will be adequate funds to repair one's own
damaged property, thus allowing people to invest with less anxiety about protection
of their investment. Life and disability insurance permit preservation of the lifestyle
of one's family in the event of illness or death. Health insurance guarantees access to
needed health care.
There is a social gain if insurers can provide this insurance at adequate premiums
to assure insurers do not suffer a loss. 5t If risks are independent and the sample
sufficiently large, the law of large numbers allows pooling of insureds to present a
small risk of financial loss to insurers. 52
43. A.M. PoUsy,, AN INmooDucrIoN To LAw AND EcoNo.cs 27, 57 (1983); Doherty & Schlesinger, Optimal
Insurance in Incomplete Markets, 91 J. PoL. EcoN. 1045, 1047 (1983); Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard:
Comment, 50 A. Ecoi. REv. 531 (1968).
44. C. GoE-z, CAsrs AND MAramuAs oj Lkw AND EcoN.oMIcs 77-79 (1984) (calculation of expected value).
45. Doherty & Schlesinger, supra note 43, at 1047.
46. Slovic, supra note 39, at 239. See infra notes 294-320 disputing that this is the case.
47. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Azi. EcoN. Rsv. 941,960 (1963). Arrow
says loading also may include a cost of capital tied up and a factor for the insurer's risk aversion depending on the
uncertainty of the risk.
48. Id.
49. Id. See infra notes 300, 308 and accompanying text disputing this claim.
50. Arrow, supra note 47, making the case for government provision of medical insurance when private markets
fail to arise, is often cited in this regard.
51. Arrow, supra note 47, at 960.
52. Id.; Saba, An Alternative Theory of the Regulation of Automobile Insurance, 45 S. Ec0N. J. 469, 470 (1978);
A.M. Poum sa, supra note 43, at 52.
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B. Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
In theory, the concepts of adverse selection and moral hazard explain the major
differences between the sale of insurance and the sale of most other commodities.
Economists often characterize both adverse selection and moral hazard as asymmet-
rical information problems: they emerge when the insured has more information
about and control of certain phenomena than does the insurer.5 3 Adverse selection
theory posits that people who believe they are likely to use a particular insurance
coverage will be more likely to purchase it and more willing to purchase it at higher
prices than those who see their risk as remote. 54
The ability of insurers to write insurance without loss is based on the notion that
losses can be predicted for a large group from the past experience of people with
similar characteristics. Insurers fear adverse selection because it means that the group
of people who actually purchase a particular insurance coverage will not have the
same characteristics as the group on whose past losses premiums were calculated. 55
Moral hazard refers to situations when the behavior of the insured may affect the
probability of various outcomes. At least three types of behavior are labelled moral
hazard. The first is when an insured purposely causes harm or otherwise falsifies loss
in order to collect insurance benefits or inflate the cost of loss. 56 This includes the
person who sets fire to an unprofitable structure, reports a car stolen that he in fact
has abandoned, or inflates the number and cost of items stolen in a burglary.5 7
Second are situations where the fact of insurance may induce greater use of an
insured service or cause the insured to exercise less care. 58 There has been much
discussion, for example, about whether the existence of insurance causes people to
purchase more medical services and to be less concerned about costs than if they were
paying the expenses themselves. 59
53. See Marshall, Insurance Theory: Reserves Versus Mutuality, 12 Econ,. INQUIRY 476, 481 (1974); Pauly,
Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard andAdverse Selection, 88 Q. J. ECoN. 44,
45 (1974); Rubinstein & Yaari, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard, 30 J. Econ. THEoRY 74, 74 (1983).
54. Adverse selection occurs when the class of risks (or set of classes) that purchases insurance differs
'adversely' from that anticipated by the firm. For example, if a firm offers a contract to low-risk types at their
actuarially fair rate, then high-risk types will also purchase it, with the result that the firm will earn (expected)
losses. Hence the problem of adverse selection restricts the ability of firms to offer efficient insurance contracts
to low-risk types.
Hoy, The Impact of Imperfectly Categorizing Risks on Income Inequality and Social Welfare, 17 Can. J. Econ. 557, 557
(1984).
55. works, supra note 15, at 459, 465-66.
56. Definitions of moral hazard by economists usually are broad enough to encompass this type of moral hazard
as well as the second type--reduced incentives to take care or make greater use of the insured service. For example,
"[moral hazard arises when an individual has the ability to affect his loss in some or all states by taking some
'discretionary' action." Kihlstrom & Pauly, The Role ofinsurance in the Allocation of Risk, 61 A.mRt. Econ. Rsv. PArss
AND PRoc. 371, 378 (1971). Another economist uses the term moral hazard to refer to "the tendency of insurance
protection to alter an individual's motive to prevent loss." Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. Econ. 541,
541 (1979).
57. Ghezzi, A Private Nenvork of Social Control: Insurance Investigation Units, 30 Soc. PRoss. 521, 521 (1983),
reports estimates in Massachusetts of 25% of reported theft claims as fraudulent. Kemp, supra note 15, at 560, an official
in the Massachusetts Insurance Department, reported observations of 10% to 20% fraudulent and padded claims in some
lines such as auto insurance.
58. F. CRANE, INsuRANcE PRscmt AND Pi.AcncEs 7 (2d ed. 1984) refers to this as "morale hazard".
59. Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. Econ. 251, 251-52, 276-77 (1973).
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The third use of moral hazard refers to situations where rates reflect judgments
about riskiness, but the insured has more information than the insurer.i ° It is difficult
for an insurer to determine whether someone in fact is being truthful in saying
whether or not they smoke for the purposes of being classified more favorably as a
nonsmoker.
Asymmetrical information problems that result in moral hazard and adverse
selection are the two variations from the ideal competitive market with perfect
information that economists have addressed in detail. The possibility of adverse
selection has been predicted to result in unstable markets and reduced availability. 6t
Classification has been termed the most important device for dealing with moral
hazard of the second previously described type-when over-insurance leads to
over-consumption of an insured service or laxity in taking care. 62 Avoidance of moral
hazard is given by insurers as a criterion for choosing among possible classifiers-
alluding to the third previously described type of moral hazard.63 These assertions are
examined more fully in sections that follow.
C. The Classification Process
Insurers use classifications when deciding whom to insure (the underwriting
decision), what coverages to offer to a particular applicant (the coverage decision),
and how much to charge (the rating decision). 64 Law and economics commentators
assume that insurers have no incentives to choose classifiers except those that predict
riskiness. 65 Some evidence indicates that classifications may be chosen to attract
buyers in the personal lines who own more property and thus are more likely to buy
larger and multiple policies. 66
A. M. Poursky, supra note 43, at 54-55, discusses this usage of moral hazard and identifies deductibles and coinsurance
as the remedies generally suggested.
60. Benston I, supra note I1, at 512. This is the type of moral hazard that enables insureds to adversely select. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text. Economic journal articles usually refer to the first two types of moral hazard
rather than this one. The first two types refer to insurers' inability to monitor conditions of the insured after the insurance
contract is made. This type of moral hazard may refer to insurers' lack of information about both past and future conditions
of the insured.
61. See infra notes 152-80 and accompanying text.
62. K. AsexuA_, supra note 15, at 15.
63. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
64. Wortham, supra note 1, at 354 n.19.
65. Benston I, supra note 11, at 529, says: "There is no reason to expect insurers consciously to use any variables
other than those that provide efficient estimates of risk." He offers as the only possible basis for a choice other than on
riskiness, "a taste for discrimination." K. ABesxsi, supra note 15, at 77 says, "Other things being equal, insurers strive
to charge insureds in accord with their expected costs." He notes that he uses expected loss and expected cost
interchangeably except when the difference is meaningful. Id. Later he says, "In a system of market-supplied insurance,
insurers already have an incentive to classify accurately even in the absence of legal intervention." Id. at 84.
66. Order of the Newv Jersey Insurance Commissioner, reprinted in House Hearings on H.R. 100, 98th Cong.,
supra note 1, at 1064-65. A Critical Legal Studies scholar alleges that the classification system parallels socio-economic
status. Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 517, 534-48 (1983). Dr. Buford Brinlee,
a Florida political science professor, set up a system for providing computerized consumer information on automobile
insurance in Texas. He testified before a House subcommittee that agents reserved a number of low-priced companies for
special clients, often those who were willing to buy more than one type of policy from the agent or company. House
Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 86, 91. For a discussion of the possibility that insurers might cut
premiums in the commercial lines and subsidize losses with premiums from the personal lines, see infra note 245 and
accompanying text.
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Such a motivation for choice may be economically rational for three reasons.
First, the overhead cost of selling might be reduced commensurately. Second, when
interest rates are high, insurers can make a profit through investments on premium
reserves in the face of underwriting losses. Thus, it may be rational to relax
underwriting standards based on riskiness to increase the volume of premiums. 67
Third, insureds who buy several policies may be perceived as more likely to be repeat
customers for whom it has been suggested there is less chance of moral hazard.68
Such rationales for classification may be economically rational behavior, but they are
quite different from claims that classification is inherently fair because "each pays his
own way." Although state unfair discrimination laws require all classifications used
to be statistically associated with risk, regulators do little to assure this is true. 69
Even if they only use classifiers statistically associated with risk, insurers admit
that they do not use all such possible classifiers. Factors usually cited as the basis for
choosing among classifications are stability, reliability, and administrative conve-
nience. 70 For past experience to predict future losses and the law of large numbers to
hold, the relationship of the classification to loss must be stable, that is, expected to
persist in the future. To avoid moral hazard, insurers are concerned that classifica-
tions used be reliable, that is, difficult to misrepresent. Classifications also must be
administratively cheap enough to use so that cost does not exceed the benefit of lower
premiums for one group of insureds. 71
The classifications used may be able to predict a relatively small percentage of
losses. The Stanford Research Institute found auto classification schemes predict no
more than thirty percent of losses. 72 The General Accounting Office examined
whether that showed the classification plans were doing a good or a poor job and
concluded that "no one knows just what that 30 percent is relative to. Clearly, the
practical limits of explaining variance in loss expectancy is considerably short of 100
percent, but we do not know what the upper limit is."'73
67. Wortham, supra note 1, at 377-78. J. WI.soN & R. HunER, INvEmTr INco.M AND PRoFT A u.r IN
PROPERTY/CAsuALI. INSURANCE RATOMAKN: AN IDmENDK)T REPORT O tE NATIONAL AssOCIATIoN OF INaSUR.A.NCE CO.IISIOS.S
TASK FoRCE ON PRoFrrAaIrrv AND INVES717MEr INCOME, printed in REPorr oF um ADVISORY CoM.nTr TO THE NAIC TASK FORCE
oN PRoFrrA mr AND INvEmEr INCOME, VOLUME II 66-71 (1983) [hereinafter cited as \VsoN & HUrTER REP.].
68. Rubenstein & Yaari, supra note 53.
69. A 1979 General Accounting Office study found that no state systematically made independent actuarial reviews
of the statistical relationship upon which classifications were based. GAO REP., supra note 5, at 130. State court cases
reviewing the work of state insurance commissioners rarely discuss standards for classification review at all. Wortham,
supra note 1, at 373, 387-92. For one case overturning a state insurance commissioner's rejection of a classification
without any actuarial data in the record, see Wortham, supra note I, at 373 n.122.
70. Benston I, supra note 11, at 501, identifies these three criteria although he uses slightly different terms.
Kimball, supra note 15, at 108, discusses stability and practicality of use in addition to statistical significance. See
K. ABRA , supra note 15, at 7 1, 78 ("Information about risk is accumulated and risk classes are refined only so long as
the competitive benefits of refinement are worth their cost." Id. at 78).
71. Later I dispute Benston's contention that there is an efficiency gain every time a classifier can be found for
which benefits to a subgroup exceed administrative costs. See infra notes 364-69 and accompanying text. Abraham says
only that there would be no competitive incentive for an insurer to use a classification if benefits to a subgroup did not
exceed expected costs. K. AiSRAHm, supra note 15, at 78. One exception to that generally accurate statement might be ifa
classification attracted new customers with considerable premiums so that investment income on those premiums
generated a profit level exceeding the administrative cost of classification. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
72. THE ROLE OF RISK CLASSIFCATION IN PRoPERTf AND CAsuAUIy INSURAN cE: A SUYov oF Tm RISK AssESSMENT PRocss at
49 [hereinafter cited as SRI REP.], reprinted in NAIC ADvIsoRY CoMM. REP., supra note 16, at 127.
73. GAO REP., supra note 5, at 118.
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The point here is that classifications, as used, vary somewhat from the accurate
predictors of risk based on perfect information of theoretical models. Much is
unknown about determination of risk. Even classifiers that may be accurate predictors
may be abandoned for other reasons. As will be suggested later, some classifications
also might be termed a device for oligopolist producers to segment the market and
practice price discrimination in order to extract maximum prices from consumers. 74
D. The Personal Lines of Insurance
This Article focuses on the kinds of insurance needed most often by individuals
for personal use: automobile, homeowner's or renter's, health, disability, and life.
Factors in the market for commercial insurance are somewhat different. The assertion
that risk classification allows comparison of loss prevention cost to insurance cost is
more likely to hold true for managers buying insurance for their enterprises than for
an individual buying automobile or health insurance. 75
The insurance industry generally is divided into two fields: property/liability and
life/health/disability. As will be described later, state regulation schemes follow
different patterns for property/liability insurance than for life/health/disability.
Some property/liability companies write commercial damage and liability
insurance as well as policies for individuals. Others limit themselves to one or the
other type of customers. Automobile and homeowner's or renter's insurance are the
main property/liability coverages purchased by individuals. Individuals and families
are those insured under life, health, and disability policies, but businesses or
nonprofit groups become involved by contracting with insurers to provide such
insurance for employees as a fringe benefit.
Automobile and homeowner's or renter's insurance are packages of specific
coverages. 76 Most of the coverages either compensate for damage to one's own
property from a variety of causes or promise to provide a defense and indemnify
against loss if a third party seeks compensation from the insured. For damage to one's
own property, insureds usually have a choice of deductibles, an amount the insured
must pay before the insurer starts to pay. The lower the deductible the more expensive
the policy premium. A consumer magazine recently reported premium savings of
more than twenty-five percent in homeowner's insurance for deductibles of $250 or
$500 rather than $100. 7 7
A major choice in life insurance purchasing is between term and whole life
insurance. 78 In term, the premium is based only on the actuarial calculation of life
expectancy and thus increases as the insured gets older. 79 In whole life, the premium
74. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
75. See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
76. See F. CRANE, supra note 58, at 74-104, for background on common coverages in automobile insurance.
Homeowner's coverage is another package. It typically covers fire, theft of contents, liability for a variety of natural
hazards, and liability for the claims of others. Id. at 159-93.
77. Homeowner's Insurance, CoNsUtm REPs., Aug. 1985, 473, 482 [hereinafter cited as Homeowner's
Insurance].
78. F. CRNE, supra note 58, at 223-30.
79. Id. at 225.
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structure is set by the initial contract and usually remains the same over the life of the
policy.80 Premiums in the first years are much higher for whole life insurance than
term because a portion of the premium is invested to cover the increased cost of
premiums in later years. Whole life policies generally have a "cash value," an
amount that will be paid to insureds if they cash in the policy, and a "loan value,"
an amount that can be borrowed against the policy.
Almost all insurance sold through individual contracts is marketed by one of
three basic methods: the exclusive agency system, the independent agency system,
and direct selling.8' In the exclusive agency system, agents sell products for only one
company.82 This sales method is common in life insurance.8 3 In the last two decades,
the exclusive agency system has made tremendous gains in property/casualty
insurance over the previously dominant independent agency system. 84 The two
largest automobile insurers, State Farm and Allstate, and other well-known compa-
nies such as Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) and Nationwide,
rely on the exclusive agency system.8 5 These and other companies grew by offering
lower premiums, made possible in large part by an expense advantage 6 and selective
underwriting.87 The commission structure for exclusive agents in property/casualty
insurance is somewhat lower than for life insurance agents.88
Independent agents represent several insurance companies.8 9 They have prop-
erty rights in the expirations of policies they sell, 90 and these rights can be sold or
transferred. 9t Agents can switch expiring policies between companies. 92
Direct selling refers to marketing directly by an insurance company without
agents. 93 Policies are either sold by mail or by salaried company employees. 94 The
distinction between direct selling and exclusive agency is somewhat blurred in
property/casualty insurance because exclusive agency companies are often referred to
80. Id. at 228-29.
81. Id. at 372.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 372-73.
84. Id. at 375. According to Crane, exclusive agency insurers wrote 20% ofautomobile insurance in 1953 but about
50% of such insurance at the time of his book's publication in 1984. He says there has been a similar, although smaller,
growth in the percentage of homeowner's insurance written by exclusive agency companies.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 376-77. He attributes success to four factors: 1) concentration on personal lines that lend themselves to
mass production rather than commercial insurance that requires a greater variety of coverage and more tailoring to
individual risks; 2) efficient administrative methods; 3) emphasis on new sales, see infra note 90 and accompanying text;
and 4) national brand name advertising.
87. D. Cu'nnis & S. WgtsBarr, THE IswuAcr oF CoxsmiR SEsvicss oN INDrrEosmr Is stasca AoNcy P RMANoP_cE 1
(1977), say the operations of direct writers "have been characterized by low prices, stringent underwriting standards,
efficient administrative procedures, and, in some cases, restrictive claims settlement policies." Joskow, Cartels,
Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 4 BE. J. EcoN. & Mar. SciENcE 375,405 (1973)
comments on the segmenting of the insurance market with direct writers competing only for the "cream" of the risks.
88. F. CRaNE, supra note 58, at 377, says Allstate agents generally receive 15% of the premium for new
property-casualty business and 6.5% for renewals. See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text on commission
structures in life insurance that range from 25% to 130% of the first year's premiums.
89. Id. at 374-75.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 377.
94. Id.
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as direct writers. 95 Part of the expense advantage that spurred the growth of the
property/casualty direct writers resulted from computerized central company offices
that handled policy writing, premium collection, and recordkeeping rather than using
agents to perform these tasks. 96
While almost all automobile or homeowner's and more than half of the life
insurance in force is sold individually, at least eighty-five percent of health and
disability insurance policies are issued through groups, primarily employer-sponsored
plans. 97 The insurer sells one master policy to the employer, who then offers
coverage to employees. 98 Employers or employees may pay the full cost of coverage
or there may be some sharing of the cost. 99 Generally group health policies charge the
same rate to all group members, the only difference being whether one chooses an
individual or family policy. 10
The specifics of group health and disability coverage usually are negotiated by
the employer with the insurer. Employees may be involved in the design of coverage
from a particular company through unions or other representatives, but at the point of
purchase, individuals often do not have much choice among coverage options within
an individual plan. Larger employers may offer several plans with different packages
of options.
Health and disability insurance can be purchased individually, but the coverage
available may be less desirable and usually is more expensive than group coverage. 101
As discussed later, the greater use of classification in such individual policies than in
groups may create a problem in getting such coverage at all. 102
For individual as opposed to group contracts, classification usually comes into
play in choosing whether to write the insurance at all, the rate to charge, and what
coverages to offer. Classifications commonly used in automobile insurance include
gender, age (usually over and under 25), marital status, driving record, zip code
where the car is garaged, use of the auto, and make and model of the car. 103 Some
companies have included occupation and personal living habits as underwriting
classifications. 104 Homeowner's classifications often include material from which the
house is contructed, proximity to a fire station, various safety devices, and zip code
of residence. 0 5 For life insurance, a physical examination and extensive history on
health and personal habits usually are required. 106 Health related classifications (e.g.,
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Senate Hearings on S. 372, 98th Cong., supra note 1, at 303-08 (testimony of the President of the American
Academy of Actuaries that 85% of private hospital and medical insurance for people under 65 is sold through groups).
F. CRANE, supra note 58, at 290 states that over 85% of health and over 45% of life insurance is group coverage.
98. F. CRE, supra note 58, at 290.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 294-95.
101. Id. For a listing of reasons that group insurance costs less, see id. at 291-92.
102. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
103. F. CRANT, supra note 58, at 136-44.
104. Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and Casualty Ins., 95th Cong., supra note 5, at
89-92 (property/casualty insurance); R. Krsst.R, TuE LwE IssuRiAcE GAim 127-53 (1985) (life insurance).
105. Homeowner's Insurance, supra note 77, at 476-77, 482 (neighborhood and safety devices).
106. R. KEssens, supra note 104, at 127-53, describes the personal background checks made on about two million
insurance applicants a year by Equifax in Atlanta, Georgia. Inquiries to neighbors and others may include the relationship
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blood pressure, medical history) as well as age, gender, and marital status are taken
into account. In individual health/disability policies, extensive questioning on health
history is likely to be taken and factored in, along with occupation, gender, and
age. 107
In contrast, for most health/disability policies sold through groups, classification
plays a much more limited role. Generally the insurer promises to insure everyone
within the group at a fixed price differing only for individual versus family
coverage. 108 Certain kinds of benefits, for example, cosmetic surgery, may be denied
all members of the group, but restrictions on preexisting illnesses are usually the only
major way in which distinctions among group members are made.10 9
As previously described, classification plays an important role in determining
who can be insured and what people will have to pay for their insurance coverage.
The following briefly describes the minimal ways in which insurer's discretion to
classify is limited currently and major proposals for changes that have been made.
To the degree insurance is regulated at all, it generally is regulated by the states
rather than the federal government. Until 1944, insurance had been held by the
United States Supreme Court not to be interstate commerce, and thus it was thought
not susceptible to federal regulation." 10 In United States v. South-Eastern Underwrit-
ers, the Supreme Court reversed its position on the relationship of insurance to
interstate commerce and made it clear that insurance could be regulated by federal
statute. I In response, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, providing that
federal laws should not be "construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede" any state
law regulating insurance unless the federal statute explicitly states its application to
insurance. "12
of nonfamily members living with the applicant, lifestyle, condition of the home, drinking, general reputation, and, in
some instances, "home life." Id. at 134-35. Insurance executives interviewed by Kessler claimed such information was
not relevant to underwriting decisions, but an Equifax executive said it would not be collected unless insurers wanted it.
Id. at 136.
107. S. HuEBNa & K. BtLAc, JR., Lwr INsuRAscE 537-43 (8th ed. 1972). In addition, this insurance text suggests that
applicants voluntarily approaching the company should be suspect as moral hazard risks because there is a better than
average chance the applicant knows of a reason he is likely to need the insurance. Id. at 541.
108. S. Kssta~s. & H. DENENBERG, MAss MARKETING OF PRoPERTY AND LtAaasry INsusRAcE 83 n.141 (1970); F. CRAN,
supra note 58, at 294-95. Some preexisting illness restrictions may apply. Id. at 207.
109. F. CRANE, supra note 58, at 207, 294-95. The Supreme Court refused to hold plans treating pregnancy
differently from other temporary disabilities in violation of the equal protection clause in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974), and of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1972). In
response, Congress amended Title VII to define sex discrimination to include differential treatment on the basis of
pregnancy. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2003(k)
(1982)).
110. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) first so held. J.G. DAY, Eco.so.nuc REuuiATno. oF INsRAcE r am
UsrrED STATRs 16 n.44 (1970) reports that the Court had so held seven times by 1901. Noted insurance scholar Edwin
Patterson pointed out in The Future of State Supervision ofInsurance, 23 Tx. L. REv. 18 (1944) that all previous cases
dealt with whether state legislation was within a state's power or gave rise to a conflict between federal and state statutes.
Id. at 19.
Nehemkis, Paul v. Virginia: The Need for Re-examination, 27 GEO. L.J. 519 (1939) shows Paul to be a test case
devised by the insurance industry in an attempt to curb state regulation, which was thought to be too aggressive, and pave
the way for a federal scheme that might be more lenient. For other attempts by the industry in the late 1800s and early
1900s to substitute federal for state regulation, see Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance Rates, 28
Onto ST. L.J. 669, 670-74 (1967).
111. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015, 1012(b) (1982).
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The federal government has not legislated to restrict insurers' discretion to
classify although there have been proposals to do so. t13 Two Supreme Court cases
have construed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit classification on
the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin in any employer-sponsored
insurance plan."14
All states have prohibitions on "unfair discrimination" in rating insurance." 5
Many extend such prohibitions to underwriting, but, unlike rating schemes, under-
writing guidelines usually are not required to be submitted to state regulators. 1 1 6 Such
unfair discrimination statutes have been construed only to require that there be a
statistical difference in the average loss between groups for any classification used. 1
7
Elsewhere I have reviewed case law under such statutes to refute the argument that
such statutes require or urge refined classification.' 8
As the Introduction describes, controversy over classification usually arises
because a group of people challenge their insurance denial or higher rates in particular
lines of insurance. Most of the challenges to use of particular classifications and the
legislative remedies have been framed in antidiscrimination terms borrowed from
civil rights law.' '9 1 have argued elsewhere that the antidiscrimination perspective,
while a valid concern for a few classifications, does not offer an adequate framework
for thinking about classification generally and deflects attention from developing such
a framework.120 Not only the public debate but the academic commentary has focused
on particular classifications in specific lines of insurance l2' and in doing so has
avoided more basic questions about the insurance market and how well existing
structures work to deliver insurance coverage.
113. See supra notes 1, 3, 7 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 1. Fora review of the generally unsuccessful challenges to classifications under other civil rights
laws, see Wortham, supra note 1, at 362-64 nn.53-58.
115. Wortham, supra note 1, at 382 n.174. State rate regulation schemes "governing property and casualty
insurance, including homeowner's and automobile insurance, usually include a general standard that rates 'not be
excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory."' Id. at 382 n.175. "Often, an additional statute prohibits unfair
discrimination 'between insureds or property having like insuring or risk characteristics...' or other such language."
Id. at 382 n.176. States generally do not have comparable rate authority in life, health, and disability. Id. at 382 n.179.
"A common formulation in unfair discrimination statutes governing these lines prohibits 'discrimination between
individuals of the same class and equal expectation of life' as part of unfair trade practice codes governing insurance."
Id. at 382-83 n.180.
116. Wortham, supra note 1, at 372 n.118 and accompanying text.
117. Id. at 372 nn.115-16. A few state insurance commissioners have ruled that unfair discrimination statutes
require more. Wortham, supra note I, at 378-79. In a case on gender classification in automobile insurance, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently agreed with the Insurance Commissioner that the unfair discrimination statutes
encompassed a concern for more than statistical association with loss. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance
Comm'r, 505 Pa. 571, 482 A.2d 542 (1984). Contra Dep't of Ins. v. Ins. Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983), petition denied, 444 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1984).
118. Wortham, supra note 1, at 387-93.
119. See supra notes 1, 7 and accompanying text; Wortham, supra note 1, at 360-70.
120. Wortham, supra note 1, at 408-14 and accompanying text.
121. In addition to the articles cited in supra note 15, two other articles take a more general conceptual approach
to classification questions. Austin, supra note 66, (Critical Legal Studies perspective on classification) and Underwood,
Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408
(1979) (considering insurance classification as one example of legitimacy of public decisions resting on statistical
prediction).
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E. Insurance is Essential
Before moving to the survey of economic analyses of classification, a critique of
them, a suggested alternative approach, and some public policy recommendations, let
me state explicitly one belief that drives my interest in insurance in general and
classification in particular, and that influences the nature of reforms I propose.
Insurance is essential in a way different from most other privately provided goods and
services. Accordingly exploration of alternative mechanisms for its delivery are
vitally important to the society. 122
In many situations, insurance is a prerequisite to adequate health care. 2 3
Families need protection from the death and disability of breadwinners. Houses and
cars are not financed without insurance. 124
There is strong social pressure to compensate the innocent victims of accidents.
More than half of the states require liability coverage or some other approved form
of security before a car can be registered. 25 Such laws attempt to deal with the
destructive capacity of the automobile, although the limits required are generally too
low to compensate victims of serious automobile accidents fully. 26
To address availability issues, some residual markets have been created by
statute. Most states have some form of assigned risk pool to provide at least limited
automobile insurance coverage to those refused by the private market, although the
cost may be considerably higher. 27
In the wake of the 1968 riots, much attention focused on the unavailability of
insurance in inner city neighborhoods.128 In response, Congress passed the Urban
Property Protection and Riot Reinsurance Act of 1968 giving states an incentive
through availability of riot reinsurance to state insurers to set up FAIR plans, a kind
of assigned risk pool for property insurance. 29 Although this Act has lapsed, many
states retain a FAIR plan arrangement. ' 30 Like assigned risk automobile insurance,
122. 1 made the argument for the essential nature of insurance at greater length in Wortham, supra note 1, at
393-402.
123. For examples and discussion, see When the Patient Can't Pay the Medical Bill, Bus. wit., Feb. 18, 1985,
59-62. As indicated in the article, the situation has worsened because hospitals are less willing to redistribute the cost of
care to other patients whose bills are being paid by the government or private insurance. This has come about because of
federal health cost cutting and insurers competing to lower costs. Id.; Ailing, Uninsured and Turned Away, Wash. Post,
Mar. 30, 1985, at Al, col. 1; Colburn Bill Would Aid Millions Without Health Corerage, wash. Post/Health, July 2,
1986, at 7, col. 3.
124. Lenders require fire coverage before making a home loan. Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire and
Casualty Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Hu mas PaNEL RE.., supra note 8, at I.
125. lNsuRANcE lI nioA-ni INsrrtrE, l sst.RicE FAcrs 94 (1983-84 ed.) lists thirty-one states.
126. Of the thirty-one states requiring all registered ear owners to have liability insurance or some other approved
form of security, a 1983-84 industry publication shows no state to require more than $25,000 coverage for an individual
and only one state requires more than $50,000 total coverage for an accident. Id. at 95.
127. Three alternative methods have been used: assigned risk plans, reinsurance facilities, and joint underwriting
associations. See Austin, supra note 66, at 522 n.23, for a description of each. According to a 1974 Federal Insurance
Administration study, rates in such plans averaged 45% higher than rates for similar drivers in the voluntary market. U.S.
DEr'T oF HoustNo AND URBaN DEvu.oNiEr, FtDRA. lNSsu AcE AoD.NisrAT o N, FtuL IssuRAscE Ava.Arry 1-3 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as FIA].
128. A presidential commission on the subject was formed and chaired by New Jersey Governor Hughes. Ht-nHEs
PANEL REP., supra note 8, at ii, v.
129. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb-3 to 1749bbb-10 (1982). FAIR is an acronym for "'fair access to insurance
requirements." 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(a) (1982).
130. The riot reinsurance program expired on November 30, 1985. Pub. L. No. 98-181, Title IV, §§ 452(b)(1), 97
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the coverages available may be more restricted and the cost higher than the private
market. 13
A few states have assigned risk arrangements for individual health insurance, but
such plans are not nearly so widespread as in automobile and property insurance.' 32
Of course, many Americans, for example, poor people eligible for Medicaid, elderly
people eligible for Medicare, veterans, and Native Americans, participate in
publicly-sponsored health care programs. 133 The House Ways and Means Committee
recently approved a proposal to require states to create insurance pools to sell health
insurance to people who are not covered at a cost no more than 150 percent of the
market rate for individual health insurance. The proposal also would broaden
eligibility for Medicaid.1 34 There are generally no guarantees of access to any
coverage in life or disability insurance.
Although liability insurance outside the personal lines is beyond the scope of this
Article, there is a real fear that day care centers will close, doctors will cease to
deliver babies, manufacturers will cease to make vaccines, corporate directors will
refuse to serve, and so forth if insurance cannot be obtained at a rate judged
affordable. ' 35
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF INSURANCE CLASSIFICATION
Much public debate on classification regulation has been nothing more than
quasi-economic sloganeering of the market-is-good, regulation-is-bad variety. 13 6
Even some of the law and economics commentary is phrased as simple faith in the
"invisible hand" without supporting analysis. 37 The following inventories the more
substantive statements about the economics of classification made in law review and
other public policy journal writings that have purported to shed light on what should
be the law of classification. 138
Economists usually distinguish between "positive" and "normative" analy-
sis. 139 Positive work seeks to describe and explain why certain behavior takes place
Stat. 1230, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1749bbb(b)(1) (West 1984 Supp.). Robert Hunter, former Deputy Federal Insurance
Administrator and now Director of the National Insurance Consumer Organization, estimates that half the states still have
such programs. Telephone interview with Robert Hunter, Feb. 22, 1985, cited in Wortham, supra note 1, at 396 n. 276.
131. U.S. DE?"r OF HousiNG ANO UrB. DvEorsmENr, FEz... Isst.rcE Aoms~i5RA'nO.i, lsistr<.ssc Crust Ls URBAN
AmucA 20-22 (1978).
132. Wortham, supra note 1, at 398-99 nn.292-93.
133. For an inventory of statutes providing health insurance or care to subgroups in the population, see Wortham,
supra note I, at 352 n.14.
134. Rich, Hill Panels Seek to Improve Health Care for Poor, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1986, at A13, col. 2.
135. For a survey of entities hit by the current property/liability "crisis," see Business Struggling to Adapt as
Insurance Crisis Spirals, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1986, at 21, col 1.
136. Herbert Denenberg, former insurance professor and Pennsylvania Insurance Commissoner, has characterized
insurers' positions on regulatory proposals as follows: "When they talk about competition, they're usually talking about
some anticompetitive measure. When they talk about competition, they're usually talking about their right to do what they
want to do, in terms of setting rates." House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 259.
137. "[Clompetition among producers usually results in the optimal use of production procedures and factors. But
if constraints are placed on the insurers that prohibit them from using the optimal mix of productive factors, the insureds
will be disadvantaged." Benston I, supra note 11, at 498.
138. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., C. Gor-z, supra note 44, at 2.
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and to predict what will happen in given circumstances. 140 The term "positive" also
may describe testing theory against empirical data to assess its explanatory power. In
contrast, normative economics views more efficient states of the world as being more
desirable and makes statements about what should be.' 41
The following inventory of assertions about the economics of classification
begins with positive analyses and moves to normative ones. The third subpart
describes an argument that is neither positive nor negative but rather a suggestion that
terms borrowed from economic theory be used in the legal definition of discrimina-
tion with regard to insurance.
These analyses, like most economics, depend on simplifying assumptions. 142
Much of Part IV questions whether the assumptions upon which the neoclassical
model of a competitive market is based are realistic for the insurance market, as well
as whether actual insurance buying behavior varies from the predictions of economic
utility theory. Parts IV and V outline conclusions and public policy implications that
should flow from economic analyses of classification when such gaps are taken into
account.
A. Positive Predictions
Arguments about how the law should treat classification regulation have
included predictions about consequences that might flow from its restriction. Four
predictions are made about the consequences of restricting the use of classifications
that insurers otherwise would choose. 143
A first positive argument, made by Professor Benston in two law review articles,
terms insurance a zero-sum game. 144 He so concludes by saying that all premiums
and investment income, less administrative costs and contingency reserves, go to
policyholders. 145 Thus, Professor Benston predicts that for one insured to pay less,
another necessarily must pay more. He does not examine the level of administrative
expenses and contingency reserves in insurance. His conclusions and general
140. Id.
141. Id. At this point, there is no need to discuss the varying definitions of efficiency. For description of four
definitions of efficiency, see Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HopsmA L. REv. 509, 512-20
(1980). Some differences in definition are discussed herein infra notes 364-69 and accompanying text.
142. See A.M. Poussxv, supra note 43, at 2-5, on the role of assumptions in economics.
143. Two additional positive economic arguments were made in briefs and by commentators leading up to the
Manhart and Norris decisions. For citations to Manhart briefs and pleadings in related cases, see numerous references in
Key, supra note 15. For comment, see Benston I, supra note 11, at 532-41. The first was that prohibiting the use of
sex as a classifier in employer-sponsored pension plans would hurt women in the employment market because insuring
women then would cost more. If employers had to absorb the cost, they would have an incentive not to hire women, and
if employees were to absorb the cost by redistribution, men would not want to work in primarily female groups. Benston
I, supra note 11, at 532-36.
The second argument was that prohibiting the use of sex as the classifier in annuity plans would cause men to opt
for a cash option rather than staying in annuity plans and result in annuity plans being primarily female groups. Benstan
I, supra note 11, at 535-36. These arguments are not discussed in this Article because they concern more the effect on
the labor market for women than a general point about refined classification. They also have been critiqued extensively
elsewhere as an oversimplification of the motivations of people and as ignoring other significant economic incentives.
Key, supra note 15, at 17-25.
144. See supra note 15.
145. Benston 11, supra note 11, at 273.
[Vol. 47:835
THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE CLASSIFICATION
statements about the workings of the market assume that competition will keep such
costs to the minimum level.' 46 Insurers' arguments to legislators considering
classification restriction have been stated similarly.147
A second positive analysis can be taken from Professor Abraham's stress on
classification's potential effect on the overall cost of losses.' 48 The logic is that if
insurance is too cheap for people of higher risk then they will not have incentives to
protect against losses, reduce or forgo activities that would result in losses, or reduce
costs of losses.149 For example, if safety measures in one's home are not rewarded
with lower rates, one will not have incentives to make expenditures for installing
burglar or smoke alarms. If risky drivers do not pay according to their actual risk,
they will be encouraged to purchase an additional car, and parents will not be deterred
from putting their risky teenagers behind the wheel.
Another positive prediction is that restricting classification discretion will result
in reduced insurance availability. If classification in rating is restricted, so that
insurers are required to insure broader classes of people at the same price than they
otherwise would do, insurers will refuse to write insurance for those they view as
higher risks.' 50 Then, rather than having to pay higher premiums, people perceived
as less desirable risks by the insurance industry will not be insured at all. It is
predicted further that if underwriting discretion is limited, insurers will still try to
write the best risks by directing their marketing efforts to those people they perceive
to be so. 15
Most of the work on classification, published in economics journals, has dealt
with a fourth set of theoretical predictions that barely have been acknowledged in the
legal literature.' 52 This body of theory, growing from the work of economists
Rothschild, Stiglitz, and Wilson, focuses on the effects of adverse selection. 53 This
body of theory will be referred to here as "market instability" theory. Their
theoretical models have been cited to suggest that if government restricts classifica-
146. Id. See the passages quoted in supra notes 11 and 137.
147. E.g., Senate Hearings on S. 372, 98th Cong., supra note 1, at 301 (testimony of Barbara Lautzenheiser, Senior
Vice President of Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.). See the quote from a former Member of Congress in supra
note 6.
148. K. An urmsm, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
149. K. AAsisml, supra note 15, at 65-66, 71-74, 77-81 (discussion in normative terms).
150. K. ABRA.sm, supra note 15, at 96-98. Works, supra note 15, at 458 (1977), comments on the tendency to
restrict underwriting when rate regulation is perceived to keep rates too low. The President of the American Alliance of
Insurers predicts this result in NAIC ADVISORY Co.mm,. REP., supra note 16, at 16. See Co. t-'mno AND REGULATION N THE
PROPERTYCA aLTY INSURANCE IN DUSTRY, A REORT OF THE cosomIc ADVISORY PANEL To THE NATioNAL CommiSSION rOR THE REVIEW
or ANsRUST LAWS AND PRoCEDUtrs reprinted in SEATE HE&ARINs oN S. 2474, supra note 8, at 119, at 142 [hereinafter cited
as JosKow REP.) (similar prediction).
151. The President of the American Alliance of Insurers has predicted this result. See NAIC ADVISORY Comm. REP.,
supra note 16, at 16.
152. K. ABRAHAm, supra note 15, at 81, cites Rothschild and Stiglitz to say that they have shown in theoretical terms
that the problem of distinguishing high-risk and low-risk insureds may make competitive equilibrium impossible.
153. Formal presentations of this view are developed by Rothschild & Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. EcoN. 629 (1976); Wilson, A Model
ofInsurance Markets with Incomplete Information, 16 J. EcoN. THEORY 16 (1977). A nonmathematical intuitive description
of this theory can be found in D. Cusmms, supra note 15, at 27-62 (1983). The theory appears as the sole economic
rationale for risk classification identified by the four authors of the Cummins' group's book.
19861
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
tion there may be no equilibrium set of profitable contracts that can be offered. 154 In
this context, equilibrium refers to a state where insurers have no incentives to change
the terms of policy offers or withdraw old offers, and consumers have no incentives
to switch policies. 55 If no equilibrium exists, policies constantly will be withdrawn,
the market unstable, and availability of coverage restricted.1 56 This positive argument
assumes that underwriting as well as rating discretion are restricted, and so differs
from the previously stated prediction about unavailability resulting from selective
underwriting. Under this analysis, availability gaps would arise because the purchase
of a particular contract by too many high-loss-probability-insureds would render the
policy unprofitable such that it is withdrawn by the insurer.
This work on market instability presumes different demand curves for high-loss-
probability-insureds (HLPIs) and low-loss-probability-insureds (LLPIs), with HLPIs
willing to buy more insurance and pay more for the same quantity of insurance than
LLPIs.157 This assumes demand is determined by an insured's perception of his
riskiness as predicted by expected utility theory. A competitive insurance market with
no costs of administration also is assumed. 158
The market instability work predicts that with perfect information about the
riskiness of insureds and a corresponding classification system, all consumers will be
able to buy policies at an actuarially fair premium, that is, a premium equal to
expected value, with minimum loading for administrative costs and residual risk. 159
This will occur because if any group of insureds is charged more than such a rate, a
competing insurer will enter the market and offer coverage at a lower price such that
prices are eventually driven down to the actuarially fair level.160
This work considers what will happen if there is imperfect information because
firms are forbidden to classify or have inadequate information to classify. Three
potential market responses are posited: 1) a pooling equilibrium where an average rate
between the rate for HLPIs and LLPIs is charged; 61 2) a separating equilibrium
where insurers offer high-rate-full-coverage policies favored by HLPIs and partial
coverage at a lower price favored by LLPIs in order to induce a self-selection; 162 or
3) if firms can anticipate the behavior of other firms, a set of contracts that will break
even on average, with LLPIs subsidizing HLPIs. 163
This theoretical work rejects the pooling equilibrium as a long run possibility by
reasoning that LLPIs will not buy policies at pooled rates. 164 Through adverse
selection, LLPIs will move from the policy with the pooled rate (Policy A) to a
154. D. C%iMiNs, supra note 15, at 27.
155. Id. at 34-35.
156. This should be distinguished from the previously stated argument, supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text,
that constricted availability will result because insurers restrict coverage through underwriting by attempting to select the
best risks if forced to charge the same rate to people they otherwise would rate separately.
157. D. CtMMINS, supra note 15, at 27-30.
158. Id. at 31-32.
159. Id. at 34-35.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 35-38.
162. Id. at 38-43.
163. Id. at 43-48.
164. Id. at 36-38.
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cheaper policy offered by a competitor that provides less coverage (Policy B). 165
HLPIs will stay with the greater coverage (Policy A).1 66 The firm offering Policy A
then will find itself with a disproportionate number of HLPIs and will be compelled
by the economic realities to withdraw the policy.' 67
Nash posits a separating equilibrium in which two policies are offered in order
to induce insureds to self-select.168 He predicts that HLPIs will buy full coverage at
a high unit price (Policy C) while LLPIs will buy a lower-priced policy offering
partial coverage (Policy D), even though LLPIs would have preferred a full coverage
policy if the price had been lower.16
9
The two previous outcomes assume that insurers cannot act with foresight, that
is, cannot anticipate the behavior of other insurers. 170 Wilson, with extensions from
Miyazaki and Spence, adds two additional assumptions to come up with a third type
of equilibrium called a Wilson subsidizing equilibrium.' 71 This subsidizing equilib-
rium is deemed possible if insurers can predict their competitors' behavior and
achieve a stable equilibrium by offering sets of contracts that break even on average
although not individually.' 72 With this equilibrium, a small amount of coverage will
be offered at a pooled rate with LLPIs subsidizing HLPIs. 173 Supplementary policies
then are offered at different rates to induce HLPIs and LLPIs to self-select. 174 The set
of policies represented by the small pooled policy and the separating supplementary
policies breaks even on average and competitors foresee that no other policy offers
will improve their position.' 75
The market instability work predicts that the pooling equilibrium will fail. 176
The separating equilibrium or the Wilson subsidizing equilibrium might be achieved,
but they would represent a welfare loss over refined classification with perfect
information.1 7" That is true because, although HLPIs would be as well off as a
classification with perfect information, LLPIs would be worse off.' 78 Thus, there
would be no welfare gain.
Regulation could require everyone to buy full coverage at the pooled rate or
enforce the Wilson subsidizing equilibrium. 179 This improves the welfare of both
HLPIs and LLPIs over market failure, but is not superior for LLPIs to classification
with perfect information. 180
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 38-43.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 43-48.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 36-37.
177. Id. at 49, 60.
178. Id. at 46-51.
179. Id. at 60.
180. Id.
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B. Normative Conclusions
As already noted, positive argument predicts that broad pooling will not offer
incentives to control loss, but does not make any judgment on whether that is a
desirable outcome. Normative argument, on the other hand, contends that refined
classification is desirable because it produces incentives for loss control.Is'
A second normative argument is Professor Benston's assertion that there is an
efficiency gain whenever a classification lowers premiums by more than the increased
administrative costs of using the classification.182 All other things being equal, a
change resulting in an efficiency gain is seen as desirable.
A third normative justification for classification based in classical economic
argument is:183 1) The most efficient allocation of resources is achieved when the
price for products equals their marginal cost. 2) Marginal cost for the insurance
product is the expected loss of the insured plus variable costs. 3) The competitive
market will keep costs to a minimum. 4) Therefore, the most efficient allocation of
resources is achieved when insureds are charged in accordance with expected loss.
Neoclassical economic theory concludes that pricing at marginal cost gives the
most efficient allocation of resources because people are not encouraged to purchase
less desirable substitutes for a good on account of a distortion in price. For example,
if freight trains are subsidized below the cost of shipping by truck and a product could
be shipped on either, shippers will choose railroads although they might otherwise not
prefer it. The society will be devoting more resources to train transportation than are
really desired by individual consumers. The railroad industry is not encouraged to
operate as efficiently as possible because subsidy keeps its price artifically low.
Meanwhile, the more efficient trucking industry is not able to develop fully.
In the insurance case, pricing at marginal cost theoretically allows comparison
of the cost of insurance to the cost of loss prevention.184 Insurance would not be
overpriced, thus encouraging excessive resources to be devoted to loss control or
saving for contingencies. 85 Insurance would not be underpriced such that a moral
hazard problem would arise, encouraging insureds to overinsure and be lax in taking
care. ' 86 Expected utility theory posits that insureds will want to purchase the optimal
181. Kenneth Abraham makes the clearest statement of this rationale in the legal literature. K. ABRAtH.AI, supra note
15. He explains not only how loss control incentives relate to taking steps to avoid losses but also to giving incentives
to forego activities. Id. at 65-66, 71-74, and 77-81.
A study conducted by the Stanford Research Institute for some insurer trade associations gives as the rationale for
"economically optimal allocation of resources" through risk assessment that it provides the correct economic incentives
for loss reduction. SRI RP,., supra note 72, at 127.
182. Benston I, supra note 11, at 496-501. K. ABsmAm, supra note 15, at 77-79, correctly says that it would not
be efficient to use a classifier for which expected costs exceed benefits to some subgroup, but he does not assert that
insurers make this judgment on each classifier or that there necessarily would be an efficiency gain if the condition were
met.
183. A general statement by Kemp, supra note 15, at 572-75, outlines a similar argument to demonstrate its
inapplicability to the insurance market. See supra note 16 for an industry group's assertion that pricing at expected loss
is a "fundamental economic principle." K. AaRAHAM, supra note 15, makes a variation of this argument at 11-13, 65-66,
but talks specifically about comparison of the cost of insurance to the cost of loss control.
184. K. ABsAHam, supra note 15, at 65-67.
185. Id.
186. Id. This is the second of the three types of moral hazard described in supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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amount of insurance when price equals expected loss, 1 8 7 and that they will remain
willing to purchase with some loading for costs. 8
8
In the previous section on positive economics, arguments based on theory
developed by Rothschild, Stiglitz, Wilson, and others were outlined. 8 9 Those
arguments include both predictions about market equilibria and conclusions about
welfare gains and losses. If all assumptions and theoretical conclusions asserted are
valid, the conclusions about optimizing welfare move from predictive to a fourth
normative argument against regulation of classification.
C. Economic Reasoning to Define Discrimination
Two students of gender classification have argued that it should not be deemed
legally discriminatory because discrimination should be defined by benefits to
individual insureds as measured by the economic concepts of present value and
expectancy. 90 Under this logic, it would be discriminatory not to use gender
classification because of the difference in present values.' 9' In the words of Professor
Benston, the leading proponent of this approach:
[T]he value of any form of insurance to the insured is measured by the present value of
the amounts promised multiplied by the probability that the event insured against will occur,
where the probabilities are assessed as accurately as possible, considering the costs and
benefits of making these assessments and controlling for the effects of moral hazard and
adverse selection.' 9 2
Professor Benston's comments addressed gender classification in annuities, but
this logic could be extended to any line of insurance (and any classification) to say
that no legal discrimination exists when premiums and benefits are differentiated, so
long as the present value to members of each group classified is the same.193
Following this approach, the defendant employer in Arizona Governing Com-
mittee v. Norris argued to the United States Supreme Court that Title VII was not
violated because men and women received equal value in an annuity plan despite
women's higher contributions.1 94 The Supreme Court rejected this test for Title VII,195
but the argument continues to be made in resistance to classification restriction
generally. 196
IV. CrTIQUE
The following synthesizes the framework underlying most of the previous
analyses. The neoclassical view of a competitive market model assumes: 1) actors
187. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
188. Arrow, supra note 47, at 960.
189. See supra notes 152-80 and accompanying text.
190. Benston I and II, supra note 11; three articles by Miller, supra note 15.
191. Benston I, supra note 11, at 492-93, 503-07; Miller, Discrimination by Gender, supra note 15, at 624-25.
192. Benston I, supra note 11, at 503.
193. See Miller's three articles, supra note 15.
194. Ariz. Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983).
195. Id. at 1083-86.
196. See Miller's three articles, supra note 15.
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behave rationally to maximize utility, 197 2) perfect information, 198 3) many buyers
and sellers, 199 4) no significant barriers to new entrants, 200 5) no transaction costs, 20'
and 6) a homogeneous product.20 2 With these conditions satisfied, competition will
drive prices to their marginal cost.20 3 In the insurance market, this would mean that
competition pressed prices to the actuarially fair premium, that is, expected loss.
Expected loss also is the measure of what a rational risk averse consumer should be
willing to pay. Any new classification for which benefits to one subgroup exceed
losses will come into use because a competitor will enter the market to attract existing
insurers from the overcharged customers in that subgroup. 20 4
The result is desirable because consumers can buy what they desire. Insureds
facing a high probability of loss will be willing to pay the higher prices their coverage
costs. Insureds facing a low probability of loss will purchase the amount predicted by
expected utility theory at lower rates. 20 5 Pricing at expected loss will result in the
optimal balance between insurance and loss prevention and reduction activity.20 6
Within the framework of neoclassical theory, it is assumed that a monopolist or
several oligopolists may dominate the market and get a price that is greater than
marginal cost. If expected utility theory is correct, only the comparatively risk averse
would purchase such coverage, and excessive investment in loss prevention would
result.20 7 If expected utility theory's predictions about the risk averter's demand
function for insurance is wrong, such that people purchase insurance at somewhat
higher than the actuarially fair premium, then profits, administrative costs, or
reserves at excessive levels may be tolerated. 208
Economists have developed the implications of one aspect of the perfect
information assumption failing to hold: the asymmetrical information problem
between insured and insurer that results in moral hazard and adverse selection. 209 In
197. Economic theory predicts such rational behavior to be in line with expected utility theory. See supra notes
38-52 and accompanying text. For dispute that people actually behave in this fashion, see infra notes 294-320 and
accompanying text. See infra notes 236-37 contrasting the approach of the institutionalists.
198. See C. FERousoN & J. GoULD, MicsoEcoxoMc THEORY 225 (4th ed. 1975) (cited in P. Btmow & C. VEUAovsKI,
supra note 25, at 8). Economists have developed theories on the implications of insurers' lack of information on insureds'
riskiness. See supra notes 53-63, 152-80, 189 and accompanying text.
199. C. FERGusoN & J. GOULD, supra note 198, at 224-25. While the total number of sellers in a given line of
insurance is large, markets for particular customers often are segmented so effective price and service competition is
muted. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
200. C. FRGusoN & J. GoULn, supra note 198, at 224-25. Some statutory barriers exist. See infra notes 278-82 and
accompanying text. The start-up costs to compete as a direct writer in property/liability insurance are a large and effective
barrier to competing in the market for preferred risks. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
201. C. FEusoSON & J. GoUD, supra note 198, at 224-25. This is also termed the free mobility of resources. For
transaction costs in the insurance market, see infra notes 238-332 and accompanying text.
202. C. FRGusoN & J. GoUD, supra note 198, at 224-25. For a discussion of product differentiation in the insurance
market, see infra notes 344-48 and accompanying text.
203. P. Btrows & C. VE2m.ovsm, supra note 25, at 9.
204. For dispute of this prediction, see infra notes 241-54 and accompanying text.
205. For dispute of this proposition, see infra notes 294-320 and accompanying text.
206. For questions raised about the trade-off between insurance and loss prevention and reduction activities in the
personal lines of insurance, see infra notes 241-54 and accompanying text.
207. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 13. For a dispute that expected utility theory accurately predicts buying
behavior, see infra notes 294-320 and accompanying text.
208. WtsoN & Husmua Rn'., supra note 67, at 74 n.l, comments that monopoly rents may show up as excessive
expenses and other inefficiencies rather than as profits.
209. See supra notes 53-63, 152-80, 189 and accompanying text.
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doing so, they conclude this information gap may result in continued instability in
insurance markets or in equilibria that are inferior in overall consumer welfare to the
result in a competitive market with perfect information.
The reality of the insurance market varies from the neoclassical model in many
ways. Insurers are not always under strong pressure to price at expected loss, and
insureds are willing to buy insurance priced at higher than expected cost. Consumers
may buy insurance at higher than the actuarially fair premium for several reasons.
Expected utility theory may be incorrect about the demand function for insurance. 210
Rational decisionmaking may be an impossible condition to meet because people's
rationality is bounded. 21' Consumer demand might be inelastic, that is, not highly
sensitive to price, in some instances because it is a "tied good." This means that
government or some other entity requires its purchase to take part in another desired
activity. 212
Even consumers may not find the lowest price available in the market for their
classification. It is difficult to get price information on insurance, 21 3 and, if one has
prices, it is difficult to tell if the products are comparable. 21 4 The offer and acceptance
process is costly in time, and there are risks of losing coverage altogether by changing
companies. 215 The complexities of the product encourage reliance on agents who may
be motivated by their own commission structures rather than the lowest price for the
consumer.
21 6
On the supply side, competition does not press price to the lowest levels. State
statutory barriers protect existing companies from competition2l 7 and deflect pressure
to reduce the costs of expensive delivery systems. 21 8 Economists who have analyzed
the property/liability market find two markets-one for the "cream" of risks,
dominated by a few large direct writers, and one for less desirable risks, left to
companies selling through independent agents to those perceived as less desirable
risks.21 9 They conclude prices in neither market are driven to competitive levels in
part because of cartelized ratemaking. 220
Contrary to theory, insurers may not be so anxious to come up with new
classifications. 22' Many insurance companies are mutuals whose structure does not
pressure management to lower administrative costs in order to raise profits. 222
A sophisticated analysis of competitive behavior in insurance markets requires
210. See infra notes 294-320 and accompanying text.
211. Id.
212. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
213. See infra notes 321-23 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
215. See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
217. See infra notes 261-62, 265-66, 268-74, 277, 279, 373-82 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 239-40, 255-58 and accompanying text.
219. See infra note 263 and accompanying text-
220. See infra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
222. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
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taking investment income into account.22 3 In times of high interest rates, prices may
be cut for less desirable risks if such risks generate high volumes of premium
income.22 4
My critique in this part and my discussion of public policy implications in Part
V come from two different approaches to law and economics-the Chicago School,
grounded in neoclassical analysis, and the institutional or transaction cost approach.
The Chicago School of neoclassical economics dominates the modem law and
economics movement. 225 One of its fundamental tenets is the Coase theorem, that
individual exchanges in a competitive market allocate society's scarce resources to
their most highly valued uses. 226 This is both a positive prediction about what will
happen under certain assumptions and a normative statement of what will happen
under certain assumptions and a normative statement of what is believed to be
desirable.
Because the neoclassicists see the competitive market as the ideal structure to
support desirable exchanges, 227 the usual focus of the Chicago School is to identify
and suggest ways to minimize market imperfections. 228 On the other hand, institu-
tionalists seek to compare alternative institutional arrangements, granting all to be
imperfect, and view the market as only one possible approach rather than the single
ideal of the neoclassical model.2 29 Institutionalists are concerned about the possibil-
ities for "opportunism" in a market exchange.230 They look for governance
structures that will minimize transaction costs and discourage opportunistic behav-
ior.2 3 1 This approach has been applied in examining why alternatives to the market
223. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
224. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
226. This theorem was developed in Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). The Coase
theorem often is invoked to suggest limited legal intervention in the market. It has been termed "ironic" that the second
half of Coase's famous article proposes that efficiency requires comparison ofcosts and benefits of alternative institutional
structures when transaction costs are significant, and thus is a forerunner of the institutional approach as well as the
Chicago School. Barreto, Husted, & Witte, Review Essay: The New Law and Economics: Present and Future. 1984 At.
B. Fout . J. 253, 261.
227. P. BusRows & C. VEuAovsr, supra note 25, at 8-9.
228. Id. at 8-13.
229. P. BuRRows & C. VrwANovsma, supra note 25, at 24-25. Kunreuther & Slovic, supra note 25, at 65 have
commented: "Because economists have focused primarily on market mechanisms for studying social problems, they have
paid relatively little attention to the impact that alternative institutional arrangements would have on behavior if an
insurance market fails."
Two general developments of the institutional approach are: Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal
Analysis:A Comparative Institutional Alternative, 79 MicH. L. REv. 1350, 1351-52 (1981), and 0. Williamson, Contract
Analysis: The Transaction Cost Approach in P. BuRRows & C. vrijsovsrm, supra note 25, at 39. In addition to this
normative use of transaction costs analysis, the approach is also used to predict and describe which institutional
arrangement will be chosen for a voluntary transaction; see, e.g., Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The
Goverance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEoA. SrUD. 265, 265 (1984).
230. G. GARvEY, supra note 25, at 26; P. BuRRows & C. Vr~usovsKa, supra note 25, at 24 quoting Williamson,
Wachter, & Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 Bru. J. Ecox.
250, 258 (1975), in defining opportunism as "'effort(s) to release [sic] individual gains through [a] lack of candour or
honesty in transactions.'"
231. P. BuRRows & C. VFuwNovsr, supra note 25, at 24.
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develop in some kinds of contracting, 2 other more general contract issues, 233 and
antitrust, 34 but rarely to the insurance industry. 235
While neoclassicists view people as rational utility maximizers, 236 institution-
alists draw on Herbert Simon's challenge that people's utilities generally are
bounded.- 7 This means that even if perfect information were available, people would
not process it but rather would simplify the world within some bounds.
The institutionalists' approach is particularly valuable as a mode of analysis for
insurance questions because important ways in which the neoclassical model varies
from reality-imperfect information, possibilities for opportunism, high transaction
costs, bounded rationality-are the very features upon which the institutionalists
focus.
The first two subparts that follow outline the numerous types and possible
magnitude of transaction costs in insurance. The third subpart discusses externalities
that arise when people are uninsured and underinsured. The fourth subpart discusses
how competition actually works in the insurance market. The fifth subpart examines
the four normative arguments outlined in Part III that purport to favor refined
classification and oppose its restriction.
The sixth subpart discusses the inappropriateness of using expected utility con-
cepts, formulated to predict what insureds should want to pay, for a legal definition
of discrimination. The final subpart considers the reasonableness of statistical asso-
ciation, with loss as a criterion for classification use on fairness grounds when its
justification on economic efficiency grounds has been considerably weakened.
A. Insurers' Transaction Costs
Insurers incur at least four kinds of transaction costs in producing insurance:
1) loss projection and classification costs, including the cost of gathering information
on loss associated with particular characteristics, the cost of processing information
gathered and extrapolating from it, and the process of applying information to ap-
plicants; 2) sales costs, that is, commissions and salaries to sales people, advertising,
and any other costs that go to making successful sales; 3) costs of delivering com-
pensation including investigating, settling, and paying claims; and 4) reserves against
loss. Administrative costs then are passed on to consumers as loading for expenses
added to the part of the insurance premium based on insured's expected loss. 2 38
232. See Palay, supra note 229, at 265; Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and
with Respect to CATV, 7 BEiL J. ECON. 73 (1976).
233. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & EcoN. 233
(1979); Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, 10 J. EcoN. IssuEs 45 (1976); Macneil, The Many
Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. Rv. 691 (1974); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978).
234. Williamson, Vertical Merger Guidelines: Interpreting the 1982 Reform in AwmUsr Pouc IN TRANsmoN: THE
CRCEN or LAw AND Ecoxomcs 253 (E. Fox & J. Halverson eds. 1984). G. GARvEe, supra note 25.
235. See supra note 25.
236. R. PosNm, supra note 25, at 3. Neoclassical analysis assumes that, although every individual choice may not
be rational, people's choices are overall rational. P. Buows & C. V.IAovsm, supra note 25, at 3-4.
237. P. Buteow & C. VEA ovsi, supra note 25, at 28 n.56, define bounded rationality as "the cognitive limits
of individuals to deal comprehensively with the complex decisions they are required to make."
238. Arrow, supra note 47, at 960.
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A neoclassicist assumes a seller's administrative costs will be minimized in a
competitive market. In recent congressional hearings on competition in the insurance
industry, Andrew Tobias, a writer of popular works on business and finance who
spent five years writing a book on the insurance industry, illustrates his argument on
inefficient overstaffing of the insurance industry by comparing it to some other
enterprises. 239 He contrasts the insurance industry's two million workers, nearly two
percent of the nation's work force, with the U.S. Postal Service's employment of just
over one third that number and with banks and thrifts, who together employ one
quarter fewer people. 24°
As later discussions will reiterate, a neoclassicist faced with excessive transac-
tion costs or profits looks for market imperfections that can be eliminated so the
invisible hand can pressure reductions. Faced with the same evidence, the institu-
tionalist sees the possibility of opportunism and thinks about how alternative
structures might reduce transaction costs.
1. Loss Projection and Classification
Law and economics commentators suggest that insurers have no reason to
choose classifiers except on the power to predict riskiness. If a classifier first meets
that condition, then it will be scrutinized on additional criteria, including whether
administrative costs of so classifying exceed benefits to a subgroup of insureds. 24
Economic models posit that competitive pressures will have insurers always on the
lookout for new classifications to attract customers overcharged by other insurers. 242
This subpart looks at three possibilities about insurers' costs in projecting losses and
classifying risks that question aspects of the previously stated summary.
The first possibility is that in times of high interest all, or at least the major
share, of profit in some lines of insurance may come from investment income. Thus,
the paramount economic incentives in the insurance business may be to design a
classification system that will maximize premium revenues. The second is evidence
suggesting that insurers do not scrutinize the cost of classification in the manner
suggested. The third is that the organizational milieu of insurers may make them more
hesitant to introduce a new classification than might be predicted by law and
economics commentary. All these possibilities can persist because of the problems
with competition in the insurance industry described in this Article.
The general standard for rate regulation in property/liability insurance has been
that investment income on premiums is not taken into account.243 Rates were to allow
a five percent profit on underwriting income. This has been criticized by some
239. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 45, 47-48 (testimony of Andrew Tobias).
240. Id. For a breakdown of jobs performed by insurance workers, see Tobias' book, THE INVsm.E BANKERs:
EVERYU"ING TE IrsuRANE InmuRV NEVER WvmEn You To KNow 33-37, 49 (1982).
241. See supra notes 64-74, 182 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 152-80, 182, 183-89 and accompanying text.
243. R. HuNrER, TAKIo THE Brm Our oF I~suANcE: INvEmurmer INco.mE e RA- S dAGO 1-2 (1980), reports that only 17
states consider investment income in private passenger car ratemaking and says that the method in 13 of those states
"seriously understates the impact." This study also reports only four states requiring investment income to be taken into
account in homeowner's insurance ratemaking. Id. at 12. WvnsoN & HuNER REP., supra note 67, at 7-8.
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economists, who argue that once investment income is taken into account a zero or
negative profit on underwriting might be appropriate. 244
In the recent high interest rate period, it has been suggested that rather than
lower premium rates for insureds in the personal lines to reflect increased investment
income from reserves, underwriting standards in the commercial lines were relaxed
in order to generate greater volumes of premium income.245 This would be consistent
with the theory advanced by some that the current "crisis" in commercial
property/liability insurance is more attributable to lower interest rates than to an
upsurge in litigation, pro-plaintiff tort laws, or excessive jury verdicts. 246
As to whether insurers do a careful cost-benefit analysis of the costs of
classification, a study of automobile insurance classification commissioned by a
property-casualty trade group found almost no attempt by automobile carriers to
measure the costs of classification on an average or incremental basis. 247 A year-long
investigation of the life insurance industry by a Washington Post reporter describes
personal background checks made on about two million insurance applicants a year
by Equifax in Atlanta, Georgia. 248 As an example, he reports that Metropolitan Life
orders such investigations of all applicants for more than $100,000 in insurance, more
than ten percent of applicants. 249 Metropolitan has paid as much as $3.4 million in
one year for Equifax's services. 2s0 At Kessler's request, Provident Mutual Insurance
company checked records for 5700 insurance applicants and reported no denials
based on an Equifax report, and only ten insureds were charged higher rates. 25t
The institutional attitude of the insurance industry may be more the avoidance of
risk than a rush to compete vigorously in the market. 252 For an underwriter, a new
classification is an unknown. There may be a fear that moral hazard will operate in
some way such that those who are so classified will not reflect the same loss
distribution as the sample on which the premiums were calculated.25 3 I agree with the
economists' prediction, stated earlier, that once some insurers introduce a new
244. WasoN & HurER REP., supra note 67, at 6, 112-35. Wilson and Hunter suggest that at the level of investment
income prevailing at the time of their report (1983), zero or negative underwriting profits would be warranted for various
property and casualty lines. Hill, Profit Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance, 10 Bt. J. ECoN. 172, 173 (1979),
concludes similarly that appropriate underwriting profits in some lines plausibly could be negative.
245. Wsos & HumER REP., supra note 67, at 66-67. See sources cited in Wortham, supra note I, at 377-78.
246. Strasser, Tort Crisis Focus Shifts to Insurers, Natl. L.J., June 9, 1986, 1, 8-9; Hunter, Taming the Latest
Insurance "Crisis", N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, at F3, col. 1; Hunter, The Insurance Industry is to Blame, Wash. Post,
Apr. 13, 1986, at C7, col. 2; Nichols, The Manufacturing of a Crisis, TE NA-noN, Feb. 15, 1986, 173-75.
247. SRI RE'., supra note 72, at 127.
248. R. Kessi. , supra note 104, at 127-53.
249. Id. at 133.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 136-37.
252. An economist, in congressional hearings on insurance competition, testified that market concentration and
traditional cartel activities stifle competition in propertylliability insurance. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong.,
supra note 6, at 454-55 (testimony of John Wilson). He argued that the exchange of price information in rating bureaus
is . . . "designed to bring security and profits to underwriters . . ." and encourages ". . . an esprit de corps, a
live-and-let-live code of ethics, commercial interrelationships, intermingled interests through reinsurance, and a spirit of
reciprocal recognition of priorities of interest. ... Id. He concluded rate bureaus "are as effective as formal cartels
in monopolizing markets." Id.
253. Vortham, supra note 1, at 411.
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classifier, other insurers are pressured to follow suit from fear of adverse selection. 254
At the same time, the pressure on a company to first introduce the new classification
may not be as strong as posited.
2. Sales Costs
This subpart examines the expense of selling insurance and considers why
pressures to lower that cost may be weak. Selling insurance one policy at a time
through independent agents is expensive. Life insurance agents in particular spend
many hours per sale.255 As compensation, their commissions range from 25 to 130
percent of the first year's premium. Additional compensation goes to managers of
salespeople.25 6 A recent book on the life insurance industry claims only forty-one
cents of each premium dollar is returned to policy holders-fourteen cents in death
benefits and twenty-seven cents in investment returns and similar benefits. 257 The life
insurance industry defends their expensive sales method by saying people would not
buy the coverage their families need without aggressive sales-the industry adage
that life insurance is sold, not bought.25 8
The large direct writers in property/liability insurance have competed effectively
with independent agents, in part by lowering the cost of sales in ways described
earlier.259 At the same time, it has been suggested that the direct writers do not price
as low as their expense advantage warrants.2 60 One student of the industry argues that
state rate regulation is the problem because rates are pegged to protect the expense
levels of independent agents and direct writers, who therefore can compete
effectively for good risks without having to lower prices to the level of their expense
advantage. 261 Other industry analysts argue that cartelized ratemaking, permitted by
the McCarran-Ferguson exemption for the insurance industry, keeps rates higher than
they would be otherwise. 262 Since the direct writers usually are quite selective in
underwriting, there may be in effect two markets in property/liability insurance-the
direct writers competing for the preferred risks, albeit perhaps not as aggressively as
254. See supra notes 152-80 and accompanying text.
255. A successful agent was quoted in a trade publication as saying a new sale required about 27 hours of work.
R. Ksssins, supra note 104, at 234. Kessler reports as typical 10 phone calls to get an appointment and only 50% of
appointments resulting in sales. Id. at 8.
Kessler recounts considerable resistance to cheaper techniques like direct mail and group insurance. He recounts the
anecdote of a California agent who placed 14 term advertisements in local newspapers and sold 88 policies with premiums
totalling $96,000. Id. at 236. The agent was surprised that applicants actually arranged for their own medical exams
without agent prodding. Still he suggested that the major value of this technique was to generate prospects for whole life
and "other higher premium contracts." Id.
256. Id. at 8-9. Commissions for managers of the companies are called "overrides." Kessler reports a Prudential
manager in Colorado who manages and trains seventy agents made $274,525 in one year. Id. at 9.
257. Id. at 2. The yields on the investment portion of the whole life premium are much less than investments a
consumer might make elsewhere. Id. at 244-47. In Kessler's words, "Somewhere along the line, the industry that collects
$50 billion a year from American consumers lost sight of what it was doing. It got sidetracked from selling life insurance
into selling low-yielding investments." Id. at 247.
258. Id. at 8.
259. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
260. Joskow, supra note 87, at 377, 412-17.
261. Id.
262. Wasoa & HusmER EP'., supra note 67, Appendix A at 29-39.
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possible, and the companies represented by independent agents competing for the less
preferred risks. 263 Capital requirements for entering the market through independent
agents are considered relatively modest, but entry as a direct writer requires
tremendous resources unless one can tap an existing network.
264
Some legislative proposals are directed to putting competitive pressure on agent
commissions. One suggestion is repeal of anti-rebate laws that forbid agents from
discounting their commissions. 265 Another is mandatory disclosure of agent commis-
sion rates or a requirement that rates be quoted net of commission.2 66 Such proposals
have been opposed by most of the industry.2 67 An expert on the property/liability
market has identified laws giving agents a property right in renewals as a barrier to
the growth of direct writers.2 68
There are also legal barriers to two forms of delivery that could reduce sales
cost-group sales and sale through an existing sales network so the marginal cost of
adding another product would be minimal. A 1970 study for the U.S. Department of
Transportation by two insurance experts, Spencer Kimball and Herbert Denenberg,
urged attention to a number of barriers to group marketing of property/liability
insurance:2 69 confusion as to whether group sales had to be authorized by statute
rather than merely not prohibited;270 clarity that unfair discrimination laws do not
apply when lower rates are offered to group members; 27t ficticious group statutes and
regulations; 272 statutes specifically written to restrict mass merchandising in property/
liability insurance through such guises as an unreasonably large minimum number of
members in the group and a high minimum percentage of participants. 273 The study
263. VIsoN & Hutmm REP., supra note 67, Appendix A at 44-53. Joskow, supra note 87, at 377, summarized his
findings on the property/liability industry by saying that "... the underwriting behavior of direct writers is shown to
be consistent with profit-maximizing oligopoly behavior of a small group of low cost firms, insulated from entry, and
operating in a market where prices are kept above competitive levels by the combined actions of rating bureaus and
insurance regulators." He finds that substantial cost advantages for the very large scale direct writers may create barriers
to entry so the large firms can set prices "'substantially above marginal cost without provoking competitive entry." Id.
at 384.
264. \Vmso. & HuNTER Ei., supra note 67, at 48-49; Joskow, supra note 87, at 388-91.
265. This was suggested by the U.S. Department of Justice in a report to the Task Force on Antitrust Immunities
of the Economic Policy Board published as P. MacAvoy (ed.), FEDERAL-STATE RELAtnsa oF rim Pirmo AND MARwnNo or
IrsumRNc 68-69 (1977), [hereinafter cited as DOJ Rwr.]. For history and interpretation of antirebate statutes, see
Wortham, supra note 1, at 384-86 rn. 183-206 and accompanying text. WsoN & Hutm REP., supra note 67, at 61-63
term these "fair trade" or resale price maintenance laws which are forbidden for other retail goods.
266. The Justice Department argued that these proposals were more likely to reduce commissions through
competition than repeal of antirebate statutes. DOJ Rnr., supra note 265, at 69-72.
267. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 112, 122.
268. Joskow, supra note 87, at 404 (citing National Fire Ins. Co. v. Sullard, 89 N.Y.S. 934 (1904) quoted in Wuso.
& HuN'rri REP., supra note 67, at 49). See Joskow, supra note 87, at 384.
269. S. KISBAIL & H. DersBsERo, supra note 108. Spencer Kimball, now a professor at the University of Chicago
Law School and then dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School, is the author of numerous articles and books on
insurance. Herbert Denenberg was then Loman Professor of Insurance at the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce
at the University of Pennsylvania and later became the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner.
270. The authors conclude that no such authorization is necessary but discuss confusion existing on the point. Id.
at 94-97.
271. Id. at 97-100. For information about unfair discrimination statutes generally, see supra notes 115-18 and
accompanying text and Wortham, supra note 1, at 381-92.
272. S. KoIBAL.L & H. DEsajNso, supra note 108, at 100-03.
273. Id. at 105-06. A more recent Department of Justice Report says such provisions may be found in
"pseudoenabling legislation which technically permits collective merchandising but actually imposes conditions and
restrictions designed to make it unfeasible." DOJ R'r., supra note 265, at 74-76. Both S. KI B.L & H. DuNENBERG,
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also mentioned restrictions on the use of credit cards to buy insurance (a limitation
that is applicable to more than group sales). 274
As an introduction to the property/liability study, Kimball and Denenberg traced
the history of group life and health insurance.2 75 Both were bitterly opposed by
insurance companies and agents who saw them as threats. 276 Such opponents were
successful in securing enactment of statutory limitations in those lines, such as
minimum group size, minimum percentage of participants, and low coverage
limits. 2 77
At the turn of the century, Louis Brandeis proposed that costs of the sale of life
insurance be reduced by selling life insurance through savings banks. 278 Only three
states permit such sales, and the maximum limits permitted are very low, despite
findings that such policies are one of the best life insurance values that can be
purchased.2 79 Critics claim that industry opposition stemmed the growth of this
product.280 Banks periodically renew efforts to get into the insurance business, and
the insurance industry continues to oppose them.28 ' One of the main proposals by
business writer Andrew Tobias, at recent congressional hearings on competition in
the insurance industry, was to remove barriers to competition from banks.282
3. Costs of Delivering Compensation
The previous subpart dealt with sales costs, which I believe may be higher than
vigorous competition might yield in both individual life insurance and property/
liability insurance. This subpart considers the high cost of delivering compensation,
a problem primarily in property/liability insurance. A prominent insurance textbook
calculates that only forty-two cents of the premium dollar in automobile insurance
goes to claimants.2 83 Thirty-two cents of the premium dollar goes for legal fees paid
by insurers and insureds in settling claims. 284 This phenomenon triggered proposals
for no-fault insurance, 285 but there has been tremendous resistance to abandonment of
supra note 108, at 74-77, and the DOJ Rsjr., supra note 265 at 75-76, describe the political activities of agents'
organizations in getting such statutes passed.
274. S. KLiBAL. & H. DENENBReo, supra note 108, at 104.
275. Id. at 19-30 (group life insurance termed "A Case Study in Resistance to Mass Marketing").
276. Id.
277. Id. Kimball and Denenberg report that in the late 1960s half the states had provisions limiting group term life
insurance to one and one-half times an employee's annual income with a minimum of $20,000 and a maximum of $40,000
while 18 states had no limit. Id. at 28 citing D. McGu., Lwn INsURANCE 696 (rev. ed. 1967). A recent book on life insurance
claims that although many states' caps on the amount of group life insurance have been lifted, most employers are unaware
of that and "[m]ost insurance companies do nothing to tell them." R. K-ssmr, supra note 104, at 237. Kessler claims
insurers do not push group term life because whole life is so much more profitable and reaps greater benefits for agents.
Id. at 22.
278. D. JoHNsON, SAvINGs BANK LaE INSuRANcE 3 (1963).
279. R. KESS.ER, supra note 104, at 234-35; TOBIAS, supra note 240, at 236-40, 273.
280. R. KESSLER, supra note 104, at 234-35; ToBIAs, supra note 240, at 238-39.
281. Upheaval in Life Insurance, Bus. WK., June 25, 1984, 58, 60.
282. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 55-56.
283. F. CRANE, supra note 58, at 125-26.
284. Id.
285. The seminal case for no-fault auto insurance and outline of a plan for it are set out in R. KEsrox & J. O'Co.,L,
BAsc PROsEcno. FOR THE TRAC Virci: A BLuEPRINr FOR RoRssuso Auro.stoa. iNsuRrANcE (1965).
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the fault system. No state has adopted a pure no-fault system.2 86 Many so-called
no-fault plans retain a tort cause of action in so many situations that there is little
saving in administrative cost. 287
Claims adjustment also seems to exact a high price in fire and homeowner's
insurance. Robert Hunter, a former Deputy Federal Insurance Administrator who is
now President of the National Insurance Consumer Organization, has testified that
only three dollars of benefits are returned to insureds for each five dollars in
premiums paid in fire and homeowner's insurance. 288
4. Reserves
The previous section quoted figures showing a low pay-off in life insurance. 289
High sales costs account for some of the difference. 29° Much of the rest may be in
excessive reserves that make life insurance companies one of the largest concentra-
tions of capital in the economy. 29' It is argued that various statutory provisions and
accounting principles encourage life insurers to accumulate reserves far in excess of
those needed for policyholder security. 292 Furthermore, it has been charged that
because many insurers are mutuals, they are not pressured to return profits to
stockholders and can concentrate instead on increasing the size of their enterprises. 293
B. Insureds' Transaction Costs
Insureds should incur at least three kinds of transaction costs in purchasing
insurance in a competitive market: 1) information costs in making rational decisions,
including determination of the insureds' likelihood and predicted magnitude of loss
in relation to coverage needed and the price they should be willing to pay; 2) search
costs in deciding from which insurer to purchase; and 3) costs that may be incurred
in making application for insurance, for example, time involved in having a physical
examination and waiting for an insurer's acceptance of the insured's policy offer.
286. F. CRA.NE, supra note 58, at 126-29.
287. F. CR'E, supra note 58, at 128-29, says these should be called "add-on" plans so as not to be confused with
the original no-fault concept.
288. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, 369, 372.
289. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
291. A life insurance trade publication reported assets at $588.2 billion at the end of 1982. Aiuc.A Cotmca. oF LFE
Issts.sc, 1983 LwE INsuRAcE FAcr BOOK 67 (1983).
292. R. Krssiss, supra note 104, at 158, quotes the chief actuary of the New Jersey Insurance Department, the
executive Vice-President of the American Council of Life Insurance, and a representative of a stock brokerage firm all
as indicating that reserves may be one-third higher than that necessary for solvency. The reasons he ascribes are use of
overly conservative estimates of investment return, id. at 156, and accounting conventions that undervalue income and
assets, id. at 157. He cites the actuarial rule of thumb that every percentage point reduction in investment returns requires
reserves to be increased 10%. Id. at 158. See also K. ORss,, CoP.Pos.,, PoWER AND SoCIAL CHANGE: THE PoLsc OF THE Li'a
IrisuRArcE I'oDusm" 72-74 (1974).
293. See generally Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policyholders, Pt. 2: The Role of the Policyholder in Mutual
Insurance Companies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1978) (on how mutual companies actually work).
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1. Making Rational Buying Decisions
An introductory section outlined that expected utility theory, as a positive pre-
diction and normative model, says people will, and should, want to: 1) buy all
insurance offered at actuarially fair premiums; 2) reject insurance at premiums priced
higher than the actuarially fair premium plus a modest loading for administrative cost;
and 3) because of the relative expense of administrative costs with regard to low
amounts of coverage, should prefer full coverage above a deductible. 294 There are,
however, many examples to the contrary.
Most individuals in flood plains do not purchase flood insurance even when it is
subsidized ninety percent by the federal government, and therefore much cheaper than
the actuarially fair premium. 295 Not much of the heavily subsidized crime insurance
is sold to renters, homeowners, and small businesses in urban areas. 296 On the other
hand, people buy insurance priced far above the actuarially fair premium such as health
or life insurance limited to one hazard, e.g., cancer or flight insurance and credit life
insurance. 297 A former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission has asserted that
twenty-three percent of people over sixty-five who buy private health insurance buy
unnecessary policies that duplicate other coverage. 298 Contrary to predictions about
the optimum purchase, people frequently choose small deductibles. 299 In automobile
insurance, while many insure themselves at a high cost for small losses by choosing
a small deductible, they take minimum coverage limits and choose not to insure
themselves for potentially large losses at a smaller relative cost. 3 0
Another rational buying issue arises with regard to the choice between whole and
term life insurance. As explained earlier, a portion of the premium in the early years
of a whole life insurance contract is invested to subsidize the insurance portion of the
premium in later years when the risk of death is higher. 301 The controversy about
rational buying arises because the interest return on the investment portion of the
premium is very low. 302 It is argued that people would be better off buying term
insurance and investing the difference at a higher return, or putting the equivalent
premium paid for whole life into term to get higher coverage limits in the years when
294. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
295. Kunreuther, supra note 25, at 228 citing H. KursNRsmR, RscovERY rao.t NAntIAL DiASTE-s: INsURANcE OR FEDER.
Am? (1973).
296. Kunreuther, supra note 25, at 228 (citing FIA, supra note 127, at 33).
297. A table of approximate pay-outs from various forms of insurance can be found in ToBLAS, supra note 240, at
72. It shows a pay-out of $.48 on credit life insurance, $.41 on cancer insurance, and S.10 on flight insurance. This is
in contrast to $.93 on Blue Cross plans and $.87 for group health insurance. See also Kunreuther, supra note 25, at 228
(citing Eisner & Strotz, Flight Insurance and the Theory of Choice, 69 J. PoL. EcoN. 355 (1961)).
298. See generally Abuses in the Sale of Health Insurance to the Elderly, Hearing Before the Select Comm. on
Aging, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
299. Kunreuther, supra note 25, at 228 citing Pashigian, Schkade, & Menefee, The Selection of an Optimal
Deductible for a Given Insurance Policy, 39 J. Bus. 35 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Pashigian].
300. See Keeton & Kwerel, supra note 15, at 149, for a proposal with regard to this phenomenon.
301. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
302. Michael Pertschuk, former Chair of the Federal Trade Commission, has testified that a study by the
Commission found the return on the investment portion of whole life premiums in the hands of all consumers in 1977 to
be 1.3% per annum. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 66, 69-70.
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it is most needed, that is, when children are still dependent. 30 3 Insurers defend the
whole life product by saying people are more likely to keep whole life in force to
preserve the cash or loan value, so even though the return is somewhat lower than
could be achieved elsewhere, people are at least saving something and assuring some
insurance for their family.3 04
A number of explanations have been offered to explain "irrational" insurance
purchasing. The nature of the insurance transaction may be such that people are
willing to buy what they are sold without making their own calculation of worth.
Much insurance is sold through agents who offer the products of several companies
and who, particularly in life insurance, offer a number of similar products from the
same company. These products often vary widely in benefits to the agent in
commissions. 305 Agents behave rationally in offering the product of greatest benefit
to themselves. There may be little motivation to sell a product with a low commission
structure. 306 If insureds do not have enough information to assess whether a product
is best for them, they may buy what is recommended without further consideration.
Automobile and homeowner's insurance may be purchased only because they
are required for other activities, that is, to register a car, to finance a car or home.307
An early study of the choice for low deductibles in auto insurance found that most
financing institutions required the low deductible. 308 A political scientist who studied
auto insurance decisionmaking concluded that people care only about "satisficing"
in the insurance decision, rather than making the optimum decision, because their real
concern is the use of the car. 3°9
Several students of insurance decisionmaking suggest that people do not think of
the purchase of insurance as expected utility theory conceptualizes it. Rather
consumers may think of insurance as an investment that should "pay off.''310 This
303. R. KrssLxR, supra note 104, at 24, gives an example of a 32-year-old man buying a $100,000 term policy from
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and investing the differences in premiums between the company's whole life and
term coverage at 8% per year. Under the term policy, at age 65 he would have $79,327 from his investment. In the event
of death he would have S179,327 ($100,000 death benefit plus the $79,327 investment). If he had purchased whole life
instead, he would have $100,000 if he died or $53,100 if he cashed in the policy at age 65. Then he says that a premium
of S155 a year would buy the same 32-year-old a $100,000 term policy from Metropolitan Life but that same premium
would buy only $8,055 in whole life insurance. Id. at 16.
304. F. CRmT, supra note 58, at 279.
305. Insurance officials, commenting on the findings of Pashigian, supra note 299, at 42, that people selected lower
automobile insurance deductibles than expected utility theory would predict, said the theory was inadequate because it did
not take into account that commissions on policies with lower deductibles are higher. Michael Pertschuk, then Chairman
of the Federal Trade Commission, asserted in congressional testimony: "By and large, the poorer the investment, the
higher the commission earned by the agent." House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 66.
One study showed agents deciding almost half the time (47.9%) which company to use based on the commission
(combined with a satisfactory price, service, and coverage) as opposed to the lowest rate, best claims service, or best
coverage. D. Cuz.r.s & S. WEisBART, supra note 87, at 62 (1977). R. KESS.LR, supra note 104, at 22, reports the variance
in one large life insurer's commission for S100,000 of whole life insurance as nine times higher than the commission
received on the sale of $100,000 of term insurance. Kunreuther, supra note 25, at 251, comments on the small
commissions to be earned by selling flood and earthquake insurance. A. TOBIAS, supra note 240, at 73-74 cites the very
high commissions available for selling credit life and cancer insurance.
306. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
308. Pashigian, supra note 299, at 43.
309. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 86 (testimony of Dr. Buford Brinlee).
310. Slovic, supra note 39, at 247-48, 255; Kunreuther & Slovic, supra note 25, at 67; Kunreuther, supra note 25,
at 252.
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would explain an attraction to low deductibles and insurance against frequently-
occurring small losses rather than rarely-occurring large losses. It may explain the
appeal of whole life policies with cash or loan values or a rebate if one lives to
sixty-five even if the return on capital is low.
A body of psychological research suggests people, even intellectually sophisti-
cated ones, are bad at probabilistic thinking. 31' This psychological work fleshes out
the dimensions of the concept mentioned earlier, namely that people's rationality is
bounded. 312 One limitation on rationality identified in laboratory and field studies is
termed the "availability" effect-that people assess the likelihood of an event by the
ease with which it can be imagined or the number of such instances that can be
recalled. 313 For example, one study found people significantly overvaluing the pos-
sibility of accidents and cancer, while underestimating the risk from such hazards as
asthma and diabetes. 314 This phenomenon may explain people's willingness to buy
single hazard coverages on risks that receive considerable media attention rather than
spending their premium dollars for coverage for loss with much less restriction on
cause. The failure to purchase insurance for low probability, high loss events, even
if premiums are subsidized, has been explained by saying that perception of the risk
must rise to some "threshold of concern" before people will purchase the coverage. 31 5
Another explanation is that the utility curve is postulated incorrectly. 316 Rather
than calculating preferences based on the asset position if there were a loss, thus
having the greatest concern for losses bringing a major reduction in assets, people
seem to be most sensitive to asset changes near zero. 3 17 Thus, they are motivated to
buy insurance for probable losses rather than a remote loss even if the large loss
would drastically reduce their assets.
Some insurance behavior could be rational if other factors were considered.
Given that people will not be jailed if their total assets plus insurance coverage do not
cover a liability award, it may be rational for a low asset driver to buy low maximum
coverage no matter the level of his riskiness. 3 18 One might hypothesize that people do
not buy flood or earthquake insurance because the federal government is often
generous with disaster relief. A field study of uninsured homeowners in areas with
considerable flood and earthquake risk found to the contrary. Almost two-thirds of
those questioned expected no federal relief, and a substantial majority expected no aid
at all.319 That study concluded that reluctance to buy subsidized disaster insurance
311. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 ScIExcE 1124 (1974); Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking 165, 168-74, in J. CARROL. & J. PmwiN,
CoGmoN AND Socts. BEHAVIOR (1976) [hereinafter cited as Slovic & Fischhoff].
312. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
313. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 311, at 1127-28; Slovic & Fischhoff, supra note 311, at 170-72;
Kunreuther, supra note 25, at 243.
314. Slovic & Fischhoff, supra note 311, at 170-72.
315. Slovic, supra note 39, at 254-55; Kunreuther & Slovie, supra note 25, at 67.
316. Slovic, supra note 39, at 253-54. In more technical terms, this is the difference between a concave utility
curve, as postulated by expected utility theory, and a convex curve with diminishing marginal utility over losses.
317. Slovic, id. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 39, develop this idea further and refine theories of choice.
318. Keeton & Kwerel, supra note 15, at 149-50.
319. Kunreuther, supra note 25, at 236.
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was primarily because the risk seemed too remote, people were unaware of the risk,
and people were unaware of the insurance.3 20
2. Costs of Choosing Among Sellers
Once a consumer has decided that there is a need for insurance, deciding among
insurers can require substantial search costs. Price quotes often are not available by
phone.3 21 Auto and homeowner's insurance are relatively standardized products but
the many variations in contract provisions can make it very difficult to compare
costs. 322 Life insurance, on the other hand, presents a complex and confusing set of
policy options that makes it difficult to compare prices. There has been considerable
discussion of the need for a standardized cost disclosure system to make comparisons
possible, and the need for shopping guides with current price information. 323
As discussed in previous sections, many consumers seem to rely on agents to
make choices for them. 324 Agents may recommend a particular policy on the basis of
the commission received. 325 Commissions normally are not revealed to customers. 326
Quality comparisons are even more difficult. It is possible to find industry
information on solvency, but it involves a visit to a library containing Best's series. 327
Consumer satisfaction with companies on matters such as claims adjustment is
difficult to ascertain except through the anecdotal experience of friends. 328 In addition
320. Id. at 242-46.
321. WVaso- & HuNrE RE'., supra note 67, at 59. D. CUseeMs & S. WESBArr, supra note 87, at 49-50, studied the
practices of independent insurance agents selling property/liability insurance. Almost one-quarter surveyed said they
would not give price quotes on the phone.
322. Much of R. KEssstn, supra note 104, is devoted to examples and explanations for the difficulty of getting
comparable price information about life insurance. He outlines the resistance of the industry to mandatory cost disclosure
schemes that would put information in a common format. Variations in dividend policies and fluctuation in rates over the
term of the policy complicate comparisons. He reports that when 20 life insurers were told that the Washington Post
planned to list the yields on their policies nearly 20 letters came back objecting to the method with several questioning
the importance of price in buying life insurance coverage. Id. at 20.
When Kessler asked an Equitable Life Assurance Society agent about price inquiries, the agent replied, "We have
a stock answer that our training school tells us to say when people ask about prices. There are 2,100 companies in the
country, and no two are alike. Where do you stop and where do you start? You buy from an agent you feel comfortable
with." Id. at 40. A Richmond agent is quoted as saying, "If they want to get bids, I don't want them [as clients]. I don't
use the rate of return because it will confuse people. People are looking for someone to guide them in making financial
decisions."Id. at 122.
Joseph M. Belth, a professor of insurance who is the editor of a monthly periodical on insurance and a consumer
guide on life insurance, summarized before a House subcommittee the problems that he finds with lack of information on
life insurance: I) prices vary widely between companies for the same coverage; 2) practices are deceptive, e.g., the
manipulation of the cost of protection versus the interest component of premiums; 3) variations in price and commissions
on policies offered by the same companies allow agents to push higher-priced higher commission policies; 4) charging low
prices for protection for new buyers with higher prices to existing policy holders with inadequate information for the
policyholders to detect the difference; 5) sharp price increases after 20 policy years; 6) not providing accurate information
to agents. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 82, 84-85.
323. See generally Cost Disclosure in Life Insurance, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust Monopoly and
Bus. Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Cost Disclosure
Hearings]; House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 49-50, 69, 246, 683-90.
324. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
325. Id.
326. See supra note 266 and infra note 421 and accompanying text for a proposal to make revelation of commissions
mandatory.
327. A.M. BEsT Co., Best's Insurance Reports (published annually).
328. An exception is a survey completed by 218,000 Co.;suME REPms subscribers. Part of that data is described in
Homeowner's Insurance, supra note 77 at 473.
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to proposals on disclosure of price information previously mentioned, a government
role in publishing consumer complaint ratios329 and data on financial security of
companies has been suggested.
3. Application Costs
Insurance sales differ from most other contracts in the time lapse between the
consumer's offer and the seller's acceptance, and there is considerably more
uncertainty whether the offer will be accepted than in other transactions. Consumers
apply for insurance and make an offer to buy on terms stated to them. The company
then reviews the application documents and collects other information by such means
as requiring a physical examination for life, health, or disability insurance. At this
point, the company may refuse the application altogether or make a counter offer with
higher rates or more restrictive coverage. Consumers who have spent considerable
time comparing life insurance costs may find, after several weeks elapse, that what
seemed to be the cheapest policy is not being offered at that price. They then must
negotiate with the company to convince the insurer that its decision should be
reversed. Otherwise, the consequence could not only be paying more to this company
but to others as well since most insurance applications ask if the applicant has ever
been refused or "rated up" by another company.330 A positive response is likely to
result in similar treatment elsewhere.
Such initial time costs deter frequent shopping around for term life insurance
policies, although policies advantageous at one age are often more comparatively
expensive at another. Concerns about cash and loan value in life may deter switching
policies. 331
The application and approval process in auto and homeowner's insurance are
much simpler, but because companies generally can cancel in the first thirty or sixty
days of a new policy, insureds may be leery of taking the risk of cancelling an
existing policy without being sure of the replacement. 332 Restrictions on coverage of
preexisting illness in some health and disability policies cause people to stay with an
old policy even if it is more expensive.
C. Externalities
Externalities are created when the costs or benefits of one's activities accrue to
someone else and are not compensated. When drivers are uninsured or underinsured,
329. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 156-57 (testimony of Ralph Nader). The Federal
Aviation Administration now publishes consumer complaint ratios for airlines.
330. Senate Hearings on S. 2474, supra note 8, at 3; R. HoLTO.Nt, REsnTms o UNDEMRITUn: RsK SmEcnoN,
DISCI IMNATION AND THE LAW 51-52 (1979).
331. F. CRAs, supra note 58, at 279, mentions the reluctance to let policies with cash values lapse. He discusses
this as a potential advantage of whole life versus term insurance because insureds arguably will be more likely to keep
some insurance in force even if the interest yield is low.
332. WusoN & HuErr REP., supra note 67, at 40, 71-72. In testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, a
political scientist who has studied decisionmaking in the purchase of auto insurance also commented that this phenomenon
makes new policyholders reluctant to file claims and hence is an indirect "tax" to keep coverage. House Hearings on
Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6 at 86, 88, 92-93.
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costs fall on their victims, who cannot be compensated and sometimes rely on the
public welfare system rather than upon the uninsured drivers. 333 When insurance
cannot be purchased in urban neighborhoods, those neighborhoods decline and
deteriorate, imposing a social cost on other homeowners in the neighborhood and on
the city at large. 334
People without health insurance may not seek preventive or early care, but when
they become seriously ill, they probably eventually will seek and receive some kind
of care even if they do not have the personal funds to pay. Their costs must be
absorbed either through the public welfare system or through hospitals and doctors
redistributing the costs to other patients who are insured or otherwise can pay. 3 35
Externalities are less likely to arise in life and disability insurance. When people
have inadequate coverage in disability and life insurance, the most likely effect is
reduced circumstances for their families. At the extreme, some people may be forced
onto the public welfare system.
The first best solution of a neoclassicist is to realize costs or benefits of
externalities in the marketplace. Thus, rules that limit auto accident recovery to the
assets of the driver at fault plus insurance would be seen as market imperfections to
be eliminated. If insurance could be priced accurately and mandatory insurance could
be enforced effectively, requiring all drivers to purchase policies with limits high
enough to cover the largest losses would allocate cost efficiently and present the
proper incentives for the decision to insure and to drive. 336 But given the limits on
accurate risk classification, this raises cries of unfairness and potential inefficiency if
those deterred are the low risks in a heterogeneous risk class. 337 Given existing legal
rules and political realities, two economists have suggested subsidizing high risk
drivers from general revenues as a desirable solution. 338
Analysis of externalities occurring in various lines of insurance as a result of the
interaction of existing legal rules and classification as it is practiced is complex. The
point here is that assessing the efficiency of any legal solution should take
externalities into account.
D. Competition in the Insurance Market
The first two subparts of this section presented a great deal of material on why
competition may not minimize transaction costs in the insurance market: oligopolist
333. Keeton & Kwerel, supra note 15, at 149-50, examine the implications of legal rules that limit liability to assets
and insurance coverage. A low asset driver does not have incentives to purchase high levels of coverage because the
benefit would accrue to someone else. Id. at 150.
334. The link between insurance and neighborhood decline is discussed generally in the HuGHEs PANa REP., supra
note 8, at 1-8.
335. The American Hospital Association says that in 1984 care provided by hospitals but not compensated by
payment on behalf of the patient receiving care was $6.9 billion, with only 18% of that cost covered by government
subsidies. AmscANs HosprrM Assoanos, THE Cost oF CoPAssioi 5 (1986). They acknowledge that most of the cost of
such uncompensated care is "shifted from nonpaying to paying patients as a hidden 'tax'." Id. at 4. For a discussion of
why hospitals are now less willing to undertake such redistribution and may refuse care instead, see supra note 123 and
accompanying text.
336. Keeton & Kwerel, supra note 15, at 173-74.
337. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
338. Keeton & Kwerel, supra note 15, at 167-73.
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practices, 339 lack of consumer information, 340 incentives for finn behavior in mutual
companies, 34t barriers to competitors' entry,3 42 and statutory ossification of expen-
sive delivery techniques. 343 Competition also can take alternative forms to price and
service rivalry in the insurance market: product differentiation, motivation of
intermediaries, and selection competition. 344
Previous sections discussed the multiplicity of insurance products and the
difficulty of comparing them. 345 Competition for agents through commission
structures rather than for the ultimate customer also was examined. 46 In addition to
these two types of competition, classification itself is an alternative form of
competition that diverts insurers from price and service competition. 347 One federal
proposal banning or restricting a number of commonly used classifications in
property/liability insurance did not limit its goals to the usual ones given (remedying
discrimination and unfair classification), but also stated the objective of enhancing
price and service competition. 348
E. Is Refined Classification Desirable?
Four normative arguments from commentators who have argued refined
classification is desirable were outlined in Part Ill. First, classification provides
incentives to reduce the total spent on insurance and loss prevention cost of losses.
Second, there is an efficiency gain from using any classification for which benefits
exceed the cost of administration. Third, if price, marginal cost, and expected loss are
equal, individual utility can be maximized, resources will be allocated optimally, and
insurers will produce most efficiently. Fourth, classification is necessary for a market
equilibrium to exist where both high-risk and low-risk insureds can buy full coverage
at actuarially fair prices.
As a backdrop to all discussion of classification, one must remember that
classification schemes used by insurers are relatively crude approximations of loss
339. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 321-29 and accompanying text. In his major study of competition in property/liability
insurance, economist Paul Joskow, supra note 87, at 404, summed it up: "Undoubtedly, there is no product for which
consumer ignorance is so prevalent." A reporter who had studied the industry alleged before a House subcommittee that
the consumer has "almost no information" on which to make a comparison between various insurance policies. He
ascribes this to reliance on institutional advertising emphasizing company reliability to the exclusion of information on
rates or policy terms. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 78 (testimony of Herb Jaffee). For
a summary of studies on the lack of consumer information, see id. at 168-69 (testimony of Ralph Nader).
341. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 264, 278-82 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 268-74, 277 and accompanying text.
344. Kemp, supra note 15, at 563-70, identifies these three alternative forms of competition. In congressional
testimony, Andrew Tobias claimed most competition was marketing, not price or service rivalry. House Hearings on
Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 52. By marketing, he refers to the same phenomena described in the text as
product differentiation and motivation of intermediaries as well as institutional advertising.
345. See supra note 322 and accompanying text. Kemp, supra note 15, at 563; see also Spence, Product
Differentiation and Performance in Insurance Markets, 10 J. Pus. EcoN. 427, 444-45 (1978) (product differentiation is
desirable when it helps people get the specific product they want).
346. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
347. Kemp, supra note 15, at 555, 564-70; Wisou & HuNrEn REP., supra note 67, Appendix A at 44-53; WVortham,
supra note 1, at 404-05, particularly sources cited at 404 n.319.
348. See supra note 8 for citation to, and a description of, restrictions proposed in the bill.
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probability. 349 They are second-best approximations of riskiness, and an insurer's
choice among possible classifiers may be based on factors other than calculations
about riskiness. 350
1. Loss Control Incentives
Professor Abraham is correct that even a "reasonably accurate" risk classifi-
cation scheme that induces insureds to invest in loss prevention to reduce the
probability of overall losses represents an efficiency gain if the reduction in overall
losses is greater than the sum spent on loss prevention. 35' In commercial insurance,
one can envision many classifications that would work this way. Professor
Abraham's example is classifying those factories with sprinkler systems at a lower
rate, calculated by the insurer on the basis of how much less fire damage there should
be when such systems are in place. 352
One could envision many examples in legal professional liability insurance.
Suppose that on the basis of aggregate loss data an insurer can determine that conflict
of interest claims generate a substantial cost in defending insured law firms and
payment of damage awards. The insurer might be able to determine that a particular
type of recordkeeping system about clients would reduce the risk and would offer a
premium reduction for firms that installed the system. A law firm could calculate with
some approximate accuracy whether the sum of the cost of insurance premiums plus
the cost of installing and maintaining the recordkeeping system would be less than
premiums without the system. If the insurer is correct about the changes in the overall
probability of loss with these systems in use and many insureds adopt them, the
overall losses in the system will go down and the efficiency gain will be represented
by the reduction in losses minus the cost of these systems.
There are, however, relatively few classifications used in the personal lines that
are verifiable, based on behavior in control of the insured that is likely to be changed
in response to a premium incentive, and that will not lead to uninsured losses being
externalized. 353 Consider a few classifications that appear to operate in this way: low
mileage discounts and cheaper rates for particular models of autos and classifications
in life, health, and disability insurance for nonsmokers or those who exercise
regularly. At least some insurers take these into account but low mileage, smoking,
and exercise frequency all raise moral hazard problems because of the difficulty in
monitoring whether insureds' representations are true. 354
If the consequence of a classification's use is that insurance is unavailable or so
expensive that it is not purchased, there may be externalities. A previous subpart
349. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
351. K. ABRAmi, supra note 15, at 65, 71-74, 77-81.
352. Id. at 11.
353. Id. at 71-74.
354. Mileage could be monitored if there were tamper proof odometers, but insurers would incur expense in
verification. Insureds could be required to self-report mileage each year. If a claim were made, a misrepresentation
discovered at this point could subject the insured to an insurer's defense of no coverage. This then would become a
question of misrepresentation or warranty in insurance law.
1986]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
discussed the uninsured or underinsured driver and the redistribution of health costs
through unpaid bills of hospitals or doctors or public care.355
As the final section will consider, if the objective is that the cost of
loss-enhancing behavior be realized by those who undertake it, there may be more
effective institutional arrangements. 356 A tax on cigarettes and alcohol with proceeds
to medical care has been suggested as an alternative to plans for catastrophic health
insurance. 357
A number of classifications used in the personal lines cannot be changed at all
or without great difficulty: sex, age, residence, 358 health history. There are two ways
that such classifications, in theory, could reduce the probability or magnitude of
insured losses, but they are less likely to promote efficiency in the personal lines than
the one previously described.
A refined classification may make insurance sufficiently expensive that the
insured does not buy it. In commercial insurance, businesses may take the
self-insurance option or band together to form their own insurance association. In the
personal lines, many individuals would not be able to bear the cost of a substantial
loss themselves or to develop a savings plan adequate to prepare for it.
Individuals instead may purchase less insurance, typically through a higher
deductible or greater coinsurance share. 359 This should act as a deterrent to deliberate
destruction or frivolously incurring costs since the insured bears a portion of the cost.
Choice of a higher deductible or coinsurance share, however, may encourage padded
claims, for example, people inflating the cost of loss to get over the deductible or
have more of the real cost paid by coinsurance. 360 Aside from these moral hazard
issues, one can theorize a greater incentive to take care. But consider how much a
higher deductible or coinsurance ratio will act as an effective incentive in reducing
loss in automobile, homeowner's, health, life, or disability insurance beyond the
other incentives that exist to avoid accidents or ill health. In economic terms, the
expected negative value of risk bearing may be decreased only slightly by readily
available insurance because of the value one puts on good health and safety.
Another possible effect of this type of classification is reducing insured losses
but not overall losses. If people simply do not repair damage or seek medical care,
there is less call on the insurance reserve, but there has been no efficiency gain. 361
Such losses may become externalities.
355. See supra notes 333, 335 and accompanying text.
356. See infra notes 431-33 and accompanying text.
357. Zook, Moore, & Zeckhauser, "Catastrophic" Health Insurance-A Misguided Prescription?, 62 PuB. IMraST
66, 79-80 (1981).
358. Residence, of course, can be changed but it may mean leaving friends and family, proximity to work, and so
forth. Many of the zip codes receiving undesirable classification treatment are in central cities with concentrations of
minority and low-income people. A variety of barriers may exist to their moving to zip codes with lower rates.
359. Deductible refers to an amount that must be bome by the insured before insurance is available, e.g., a $100
deductible. Coinsurance means the insured pays a percentage of the loss, e.g., insurer pays 80% and insured pays 20%.
360. Kemp, supra note 15, at 555, 560.
361. WILSON & HuNER- REP., supra note 67, at 63-66, comments that such a shifting from auto insurer to the person
without insurance is not an efficiency gain in the usual sense.
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The third possible effect of classification on behavior is to cause some premiums
to be so high that the activity to be insured is forgone: some people choose not to
drive, buy a particular house, or go to a certain doctor. Further analysis of this effect
shows that such results are not always efficiency gains. If territorial classification
makes a house in one neighborhood uninsurable or unaffordable because the
insurance cost is too expensive, the buyer may be forced to buy a more expensive or
less desirable house elsewhere. The neighborhood and its residents also suffer as
property conditions and values decline.
If people with a treatable condition delay seeking medical care, the condition
may become more expensive to treat and result in greater work loss, etc. Here again
there would be no efficiency gain. If safe young drivers are deterred from buying cars
because of higher rates resulting from the group average rate for all young drivers,
resources are not allocated efficiently. 362 Only if the drivers actually deterred from
driving are the risky ones can there be an efficiency gain.3 63
In sum, incentive for loss control is the one justification for refined classification
that makes economic sense given the approximate state of classification. However, it
does not have equal force for all classifications that on their face might seem to have
a loss reduction result. Such classifications should not be accepted uncritically but
rather scrutinized for the way they might work and for possible alternatives that might
be more efficient.
2. Efficiency Gain When Benefit to Some Exceeds Administrative Costs
Benston asserts that there is an efficiency gain from using a classification if the
resulting premium reduction for some does not exceed administrative cost. 364 But,
unless the refinement in classification improves moral hazard or alters demand
patterns, reclassification does not meet the usual definition of efficiency gain used in
economics. All that is accomplished is a redistribution of cost.
The usual economic definitions of efficiency gain are the Pareto optimal one that
no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off,365 and the
Kaldor-Hicks definition that the gain is sufficient if the winners can compensate the
losers. 366 To illustrate, assume a group of insureds now are pooled but that use of a
classification would divide them into subgroups. For example, men and women under
twenty-five who now pay a premium (p) for auto insurance based on the average loss
of the entire group would be classified by sex, a cheap classifier to use. If men as a
group have a higher loss than women as a group, men's premiums (m), based on their
group average, would be higher than women's premiums (w), based on their group
average. Premiums m plus w would sum to p assuming the subgrouping did not
362. JosKow REP., supra note 150, at 145-47, notes this as a "theoretical rationale" for greater efficiency in
cross-subsidization. See also Schmalensee, Imperfect Information and the Equitability of Competitive Prices, 99 Q.J.
EcoN. 441 (1984).
363. A.M. PoLusKy, supra note 43, at 115-17.
364. Benston 1, supra note 11, at 497-98.
365. See Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HovssmA L. Rav. 509, 512-13 (1980);
A.M. Pou~sKy, supra note 43, at 7, n.4.
366. See Coleman, supra note 365, at 513-14.
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change moral hazard367 or affect the demand schedules.3 68 The women, who pay
more than p, will be better off than they were before, and the men will be worse off.
Thus, the Pareto optimal definition is not satisfied. As the women cannot compensate
the men and still have any net gain, the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency is not
satisfied either. All that has been accomplished is a redistribution of cost.369
3. Benefit When Price = Marginal Cost = Expected Loss
Marginal cost for the insurance product is the expected loss of the insured, that
is, the actuarially fair premium, plus variable administrative costs. Expected utility
theory predicts that insureds will be willing to purchase insurance at actuarially fair
premiums with a modest loading for costs.
Assume that p1 on Figure I represents the point at which price equals expected
loss plus minimum administrative costs. A previous section offered several explana-
tions of why insureds may purchase insurance even if it is priced considerably above
expected loss. 3 70 Assume that an insured will purchase the same quantity of insurance
even if the price rises as high as p2. The distance between p1 and p2 represents a
transfer of wealth to the insurer who can now price above marginal cost and sell the
same amount of insurance. This may represent an excess in profits, administrative
costs, or reserves. Previous discussions outlined a number of areas where such
excesses may exist in the personal lines of insurance.
A fundamental assumption of maximum efficiency at price equal to marginal
cost is that it allows rational consideration of substitutes. The limits to reducing the
probability or magnitude of losses as a substitute for insurance already have been
discussed. Another substitute for insurance is appeals to charity or government. If
such appeals are necessary, it means that insured losses alone, rather than total losses,
have been reduced. If charity or government compensates such losses, the costs of the
losses are still redistributed, but in a different manner than through insurance.
367. It has been argued that when a group such as young men consider themselves overcharged they are more likely
to try and recoup some of their premiums by filing false or fraudulent claims. See infra note 372 and accompanying text.
368. If some men decide not to purchase insurance when costs go up and more women purchase as costs go down,
p may go down. The gain still will have been at the expense of the men who are now either uninsured or forgoing car
ownership. There is no Pareto gain, and there is a Kaldor-Hicks gain only if the women gain enough to compensate the
men and still have a surplus.
369. Benston states this as an obvious gain, supra note 182 and accompanying text. He does not discuss the
possibility of the change in the demand schedules outlined in supra notes 367-68 and accompanying text as necessary to
realize the gain.
Economists writing in the economics literature generally have not focused on this issue, but one commentator has
made this point recently about groups that were pooled before a classification is introduced. Hoy, Categorizing Risks in
the Insurance Industry, 97 Q. J. EcoN. 321, 336 (1982); Hoy, supra note 54, at 558. Schmalensee, Imperfect Information
and the Equitability of Competitive Prices, 99 Q. J. EcoN. 441,452 n.23 (1984) notes the similarity of his results to Hoy's,
but Schmalensee's analysis focuses on horizontal equity, treating equals equally, and vertical equity, treating those who
are unequal in a way that "fairly" reflects their differences. Id. at 447-48. He concludes that better information generally
reduces vertical inequity but may well increase horizontal inequity. Id. at 455. He finds improvement in horizontal equity
by use of a new classification depends on how much the new classification improves information and how good the initial
information about buyer-specific costs was. Id. at 456. WanoN & Humnr RE'., supra note 67, at 64-65 also comments
that such selection competition merely shifts losses around rather than reflecting enhanced economic efficiency.
370. See supra notes 294-320 and accompanying text.
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Professor Abraham says pricing at expected loss avoids moral hazard because
people are not given incentives to overinsure and thus be lax in taking care.
37 1
Another type of moral hazard problem may be created, however, if people who
consider themselves unfairly priced for the coverage they must purchase are
motivated to recoup their premiums by fabricating or exaggerating claims of loss.
372
Price Supply
P2
PI
Quantity
4. Classification as Necessary for Optimal Market Equilibrium
Much of the writing in economics journals about the function of risk classifi-
cation in insurance has grown from the work of Rothschild, Stiglitz, and Wilson
described earlier. 373 It is a subpart of a recently developed body of economic theory
that has been termed the "analytics of uncertainty and information." 374
Generally this body of work has been positive, concerned with explanations and
predictions about the workings of the insurance market. Although it does sometimes
draw normative conclusions about states that are Pareto optimal, the economic
theorists writing in this area generally have not attempted to suggest public policy
conclusions from their work.
A book by four professors from the Wharton School of Business and Finance
summarizes much of this theoretical work and puts it in non-mathematical, intuitive
371. K. ABas.i., supra note 15, at 15. This is the second of the three types of moral hazard described in supra notes
56-60 and accompanying text.
372. Kemp, supra note 15, at 577, makes this point and cites as anecdotal evidence that the theft claim rate for under
25 males is higher in a number of jurisdictions. This might be explained in part if young drivers have cars more attractive
to thieves, but it may also suggest, as Kemp does, that perceived overcharge encourages fraudulent reporting. This is the
third of the three types of moral hazard discussed at supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 152-S0 and accompanying text.
374. This phrase is the title of a lengthy survey of the literature in this field, Hirshleifer & Riley, The Analytics of
Uncertainty and Information-An Expository Survey, 17 t. Ecv. Lmr:ATuRE 1375 (1979).
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terms. 375 The Wharton group uses the work to support public policy suggestions
about the undesirability of government restriction of classification. In doing so, they
ignore or gloss over some assumptions in the theoretical work that do not apply to the
actual functioning of insurance markets. 376
The theoretical work begins by positing a market permitting classification in
which perfect information about the risks presented by potential insureds is available
to insurers. 377 It concludes that, when a competitive market with this perfect
information exists, prices are driven to the actuarially fair level. 378 This is because
lower priced policies are offered by competitors to any group overcharged. 379
Previous discussions dispute important premises of this work, namely that in-
surers will rush to find new classifiers to separate out overcharged subgroups and that
insureds will find the premium nearest actuarial fairness and be unwilling to purchase
insurance at rates substantially above this rate. The Wharton group acknowledges in
a footnote that questions have been raised about consumer information, but they do
not integrate into their analysis the implications of the failure of this condition. 380
The competitive market with perfect information for classification is presented
as a model against which to compare implications when information is not perfect.
The Wharton group acknowledges that this state of the world will exist both when
government restricts classification and when insurers do not have adequate informa-
tion about risk.381 They proceed, however, to conclude that alternatives in which the
government regulates are Pareto inferior to unfettered classification with perfect
information. 382 This ignores the previously described problems with the insurance
market that exist regardless of what the government does about classification. 383 The
insurance market always operates in the world of the second best. The Wharton group
brands regulatory solutions mandating coverage and subsidization as Pareto inferior
to the ideal,384 but does not squarely acknowledge the impossibility of the ideal.
F. Present Value as a Measure of Discrimination
When one says price equals expected loss, one is saying that the price equals the
expected loss for each insured, based on the classification chosen. There may be
economically rational reasons for using classifications that do not predict expected
loss. 3 85
Even if classifications related to riskiness alone were used, and they were
winnowed solely upon the basis of economically defensible criteria, it would not be
correct to say that the premium calculated on the classifications chosen by the insurer
375. D. CuwMMs, supra note 15.
376. See infra notes 380-84 and accompanying text.
377. D. CUmMuns, supra note 15, at 30-35.
378. Id. at 34.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 59, 62.
381. Id. at 36.
382. Id. at 48-51.
383. See supra notes 72-74, 294-329 and accompanying text.
384. Id.
385. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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represents the actual expected value for an individual insured. The criteria used to
winnow classifications may be appropriate to permit their use, but do not permit one
to say that the value received by two insureds classified differently is the same. A
premium based on some, but not all, possible classifications represents the expected
loss for each member of a group with the characteristic(s) isolated. An individual
might have a very different expected loss if other characteristics of his had been
considered. 38 6 A regulator might find, for example, that the insurer's choice of
classification is defensible as a second-best approximation of riskiness and an
adequately fair basis for insurance premiums, but the result is not the expected value
of the theoretical actuarially fair premium definition.
The second-best approximations of expected value actually used are not
sufficiently accurate to compel their usage on efficiency grounds. As one economic
commentator has put it, "I know of no general theorem establishing that making
information better always enhances efficiency... though making it perfect clearly
does So.''387
G. Fairness
It may seem fair in some moral sense for people with a characteristic indicating
greater probability of loss to pay more for insurance. 388 The bulk of this Article, of
course, is not about perceptions of fairness but about contentions that unfettered
classification discretion as practiced by insurers is economically efficient.
I have concluded elsewhere that statistical association with loss is a valid con-
sideration in government approval of classification because of the perception of
fairness and legitmacy associated with it.389 As acknowledged in this Article, clas-
sifications providing loss control incentives are supported by economic efficiency
arguments. Statistical association of loss must exist for each such classification to
provide a valid loss control incentive. I believe, however, that statistical association
with loss should be seen only as a somewhat necessary, but not a sufficient, criterion
for permissible use of a classification. 390 I say somewhat necessary because a regulator
might permit use of a classification that would seem to encourage loss control for which
adequate data on effect was not yet available. It is not clear that insurers and their
regulators now require statistical association with loss before permitting a classifi-
cation's use. 39 1
386. Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock, & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A
Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 505, 512 n.32 (1980) offered the example of the newborn, black
male in South Carolina for whom life expectancy might vary from 58.33 to 70.75 years depending on indicators chosen.
387. Schmalensee, supra note 369, at 442 (emphasis in original) (addressing equity of prohibiting some
classification variables in auto insurance).
388. Williams, supra note 15, at 219-24, discusses unfair discrimination in insurance rating as a moral concept.
389. Wortham, supra note 1, at 417-18.
390. The standards for classification that I have proposed elsewhere illustrate how such a scheme could be
implemented. Wortham, supra note 1, at 417-18. Statistical power to predict losses and the degree of statistical separation
of the grouping from other insureds are two criteria that state regulators would be required, by federal law, to consider
in approving classification schemes. Id. See also infra note 406 and accompanying text.
391. Worham, supra note 1, at 372-73.
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Elsewhere in this Article, I argue that consideration of alternative institutional
schemes to meet the ends achieved by private insurance should consider transaction
costs and externalities. 392 It also is appropriate to consider as a criterion a Rawlsian
definition of fairness in addition to statistical association with loss. John Rawls has
suggested that the most just distribution of assets may be that which would have been
chosen by potential beneficiaries before the natural lottery of endowments took
place. 393 This suggests that a countervailing consideration of controllability might
outweigh statistical association with loss in some instances. 394 For example, those
suffering from disease, genetic defect, or disability on the basis of the natural lottery
should not be penalized in insurance. 395
Deciding how controllability of a classifier should be considered does not
answer all difficult questions about how to apply it with regard to particular lines of
insurance and particular classifications. We may decide not to penalize someone with
cancer in health insurance but be more willing to allow the classifier's use to restrict
the purchase of life insurance. Opinion differs on the degree of controllability there
is over some characteristics, for example, obesity.
H. Mechanics of Insurance Regulation Schemes
Economic theory offers useful insights into the design of insurance regulatory
schemes. It is likely that restriction of rating classification without other restrictions
may result in insureds whom insurers would have charged a higher premium being
turned down altogether or in marketing being directed to preferred applicants. 396 If
classification restriction is deemed a desirable intervention to meet an objective, it
probably would have to be accompanied by some underwriting restriction to be
effective. 397
It should be considered for a particular line and a particular coverage how
serious the adverse selection concern really is, that is, whether classification
restriction and broader pooling will result in the best risks dropping out of the pool.
If automobile insurance is mandatory and all insureds are subject to the same
restrictions, it seems less likely that this will occur although some uninsured drivers
will escape enforcement. On the other hand, if classifications were restricted in
392. See infra notes 431-37 and accompanying text.
393. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTcIC 11-17 (1971); K. ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 99, discusses Rawls' concept of
the "natural lottery" in discussing how broadly losses should be spread through insurance.
394. K. ABRPAAM, supra note 15, at 29 discusses controllability as a criterion going to egalitarian values. In an earlier
article, I proposed criteria for approving insurance classifications that included controllability as a consideration to be
weighed. Wortham, supra note 1, at 418. Those criteria are reprinted at infra note 408.
395. The following results lend support to the idea that, at least sometimes, people share this philosophy. In response
to a Louis Harris survey conducted for BusuiEss WEEK, 75% of those questioned said that insurance companies would not
be justified in refusing to insure the lives or health of people whom gene tests indicated are likely to come down with a
fatal disease later in life. The Giant Strides in Spotting Genetic Disorders Early, Bus. WVK., Nov. 18, 1985, 82, 85.
396. Thus, I agree with the predictions of those cited in supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
397. Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and South Carolina have adopted a form of full
insurance availability for automobile insurance. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 163.
Michigan has such a system for homeowner's insurance. Id. Such systems require companies to take all risks meeting
certain criteria but allow some ceding to a reinsurance facility of those claimed undesirable. FIA, supra note 127, at
73-76, 78-82.
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individual health insurance, it might be that this already costly product would become
so expensive that many people would be unable to buy it.
Earlier three types of moral hazard were identified: 1) when the insured might
purposely cause harm or otherwise falsify loss; 2) when the fact of insurance might
induce greater use of an insured service or cause the insured to take less care; and 3)
when rates are supposed to reflect judgments about riskiness but the insurer cannot
gain reliable information in possession of the insured on that risk.
The first and second types of moral hazard have little to do with the classification
controversy because there is probably no reliable way to divine many classifications
that select people more prone to commit fraud. 398 This type of moral hazard may be
a factor in why otherwise beneficial insurance markets may fail to arise.
The third type of moral hazard is raised in the classification controversy because
classification reliability is argued as justification for immutable classifications like
sex399 and raised as a problem with the classifications that reformers often wish to
substitute such as smoking habits and mileage of cars driven. 4°° Insurance law
doctrine on warranty and representation exists in part to deal with such problems. 40 1
Explicit and conspicuous warnings on insurance applications about the consequences
of misrepresenting information on an insurance application might be helpful in
reducing these concerns.
V. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In a previous article, I criticized the assertion in public debate on regulation of
insurance classification that unfettered discretion of insurers to classify promotes
fairness because insureds then pay their fair shares. 4° 2 I also rejected the contention
that refined classification is urged, if not required, by state law.4 ° 3 The focus here has
been to examine another common argument-that economic reasoning supports
insurers' discretion to classify and rejects government restriction of classification.
After giving background on economic theory on insurance and insurance
practices, Part III outlined the economic analyses of classification that have appeared
in law and public policy literature. My major conclusion is that the explanatory,
predictive, and prescriptive power of almost all these analyses depends on assump-
tions about a competitive market and accurate information about risk that are highly
questionable. Part IV reviews material questioning those assumptions for the
insurance market and suggests instead many instances of market failure on the supply
and demand sides.
The following discussion of public policy implications is divided into two
sections. The first assumes the basic framework of existing private insurance markets
398. Ghezzi, supra note 57, at 521, reports estimates in Massachusetts of 25% of reported theft claims as fraudulent.
Kemp, supra note 15, at 560, a former official in the Massachusetts Insurance Department, reported observations of 10
to 20% fraudulent and padded claims in some lines such as auto.
399. Benston 1, supra note 11, at 509-10.
400. Id.
401. R. K sro., BLsic TLx-r ON INsumSNcE LAw 369-409 (1971).
402. Wortham, supra note 1, at 370-80.
403. Id. at 381-92.
1986]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
with government regulation, and reforms discussed are limited to legislated changes
in regulation schemes.
The second section suggests beginning without assuming the status quo and
applying an institutionalist perspective on whether there are alternative structures that
would take into account the limits on human rationality and perfecting information.
Thus, one would consider whether there are structures alternative to the market to
reduce transaction costs. The second section also argues that analyses of efficiency of
particular reforms should take externalities into account.
Specific proposals for change in each of the personal lines of insurance is beyond
the scope of this Article. Part IV offers enough data to question some common
shibboleths in the classification debate but not enough information about individual
lines and their markets to advocate specific changes. 4° 4 My purpose has been to strip
away the legitimacy of catch phrases that stifle debate, suggest ways to reframe issues
on the economics of insurance classification, and expand the parameters of reforms
considered.
A. Reforms Within the Existing Framework
Given the highly imperfect world of actual classification, 40 5 there is no general
justification for insurers' unfettered discretion to use the classifiers they select from
all possible classifiers. Thus, there is not necessarily a diminution in efficiency in all
instances when regulators restrict classification discretion.
The fact that insurers choose only one or a few of all possible classifiers is also
the reason why expected value calculated on classifications chosen is not the single
appropriate definition of discrimination as contended by the defendant employer in
Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris.40 6 The Supreme Court rejected such a
definition for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and found
a violation of the Act in requiring larger contributions from women in order to receive
equal annuity benefits. 4° 7
Elsewhere I have outlined a proposed legislative scheme that would prohibit
some classification and require regulators to weigh stated criteria in approving other
proposed classifiers. 4° 8 One of the criteria suggested is "the degree of incentive
404. If insurance were federally regulated, there probably would be more public information on practices and market
behavior. In 1980, Congress required that any study of the Insurance Industry by the Federal Trade Commission be
requested by a majority of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation or the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1982). Since insurers are immunized from general federal laws by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982), information that might be generated in litigation, e.g., antitrust
cases, such as data on collusive practices, market structure, and competition is not available.
405. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
406. 463 U.S. 1073, 1082 (1983).
407. Id. at 1083.
408. The full list of criteria I proposed that state regulators be required to weigh in approving other classifications
are:
A) the statistical power of the characteristic's prediction of loss;
B) the degree of statistical separation of the grouping of insureds from the remainder of the insured population which
results from the use of the category;
C) whether the characteristic's relation to loss can be supported by a persuasive causal explanation;
D) the degree of incentive created by the use of such characteristic in rating for reduction in number or cost of losses;
E) the degree to which the classification is controllable by individual insureds;
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created . . . for reduction in number or cost of losses." 409 Even with the approximate
accuracy of classification achievable, classifications that actually provide a trade-off
between the cost of loss prevention and the cost of insurance provide an efficiency
justification. Part IV suggests, however, that there may be relatively few such
classifications in the personal lines that are verifiable, based on behavior in control
of the insured that is likely to change in response to a premium incentive, and that will
not lead to uninsured losses being externalized. 4 10 Even classifications that present
such incentives properly might yield to other goals of insurance law.
411
As described in the Introduction, insurance classification often is character-
ized as a zero-sum game in the classification debate. 412 This has potent political effect
because it turns subgroups of insureds against each other and deflects scrutiny from
the part of the premium dollar that may go to excessive administrative expenses,
reserves, or profit. Without any other change, restricting classification discretion will
redistribute the cost of losses among insureds. 41 3 Much of this Article suggests
looking at whether there are "other changes" that could reduce an insured's
premiums or hold it constant even with classification restriction.
Neoclassicists offer many proposals to pressure price competition in ways that
would pressure reduction in transaction costs. As described earlier, proposals have
been made to repeal state laws deemed barriers to competition: anti-rebate,
414
fictitious group statutes and regulations, 4 5 agents' property rights in renewal, 41 6 rate
regulation itself,417 etc. The McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption from federal laws,
not specifically applicable to insurance, also has been proposed for repeal, with
F) the compatibility with widely held social values of the use of the characteristic by which the grouping is defined;
and
G) the alternatives to private insurance coverage that are available to potential insureds who cannot get this insurance.
Wortham, supra note 1, at 417-18. I also advocated a ban on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin classification.
For more detail on my proposed scheme and a comparison of these criteria with those proposed by others, see id. at
417-20.
409. See supra note 408, subparagraph D.
410. See supra notes 351-63 and accompanying text.
411. My proposal for federal standards of judging classification includes: controllability, social values, and
alternatives to private insurance coverage for those who cannot obtain it, in addition to incentives for loss control and their
relation to riskiness. Wortham, supra note 1, at 417-18. My seven criteria are reprinted in note 408 supra. They would
be weighed by state regulators, who would be required to make written findings on their decisions. Wortham, supra note
1, at 418.
K. ABRAuA.,, supra note 15, at 8-36, discusses three purposes he sees insurance law serving-economic efficiency,
fair distribution of risk, and the promotion of equitable relations between insurers and insureds. Providing incentives for
loss control serves the economic efficiency purpose. He sees three philosophies competing to define a fair distribution of
risk-libertarianism, utilitarianism, and egalitarianism. Id. at 18-29. His approach is "intuitive pragmatism" that weighs
values when there is a conflict. Id. at 29-31. Abraham says, and I agree, that he would like to see more influence by
egalitarian values in insurance law. Id. at 30. He does not have a philosophical problem with fairness concerns
outweighing efficiency concerns, but analyzes complications created in the market in trying to achieve the fairness
objectives. Id. at 96-100. One of these is that insurers will restrict underwriting in reaction to restrictions on rating
discretion. See supra note 150-51 and accompanying text. Austin, supra note 66, at 558 n.257, cites Critical Legal
Studies philosopher RoBtro UNER, KNo oaorE & Pouncs 94-95 (1975), on the impossibility of weighing values that
are subjective.
412. See supra notes 1-9, 144 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 364-69 and accompanying text.
414. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
415. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
416. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
417. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
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exemption from most antitrust laws being the major focus of concern. 41 8 Although the
neoclassicists are wary of government, they will contemplate an affirmative role in
the provision of information: printing shopping guides with price information,4 19
mandating a standard disclosure format,420 and requiring disclosure of agent
commissions. 42'
I agree with the economic prediction that restricting classification may result in
reduced availability unless underwriting also is restricted. 422 With classification in
rating and underwriting restricted, costs for some insureds probably will go up if there
are no commensurate reductions based on transaction costs.
Whether classification restriction is a desirable tool to achieve a goal like greater
perceived fairness or availability of coverages should take into account the adverse
selection consequences of those who may drop out of the insurance pool as costs go
up. For example, if the cost of individual health and disability policies goes up
because particular genetic traits, tendency toward diseases, or health histories cannot
be used as classifications, the healthiest in insurance pools may decide to forgo
coverage. 42 3 Coverage likely would become more expensive. If automobile insurance
is mandatory, the adverse selection problem is likely less severe although studies
show enforcement of mandatory schemes is difficult. 424
Restricting classification as a tool to achieve goals such as greater insurance
availability or fairness also raises questions about whether the pool of people buying
the coverage is the appropriate group to share additional costs. Mandatory automobile
coverage means cost is widely spread. Those buying auto insurance may be an
appropriate group to share the cost of insured losses. 425 If there is a social obligation
to care about health care and the support of people who are ill, more of the population
than those who buy individual disability or health policies should bear the cost.426
418. E.g., S. 2474, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 126 CoNG. REc. 6530 (1980). See also House Hearings on
Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6 (generally addressed to MeCarran-Ferguson repeal).
419. Senator Metzenbaum's Insurance Competition Improvement Act would have required the states to prepare such
guides. S. 2474, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. §§ 7, 9, 126 CoNG. REc. 6529, 6531 (1980). See supra note 8 and accompanying
text for other information on the bill.
420. House Hearings on Competition, 98th Cong., supra note 6, at 156-57 (recommendation of Ralph Nader) and
245 (recommendation of Herbert Denenberg citing New York state's experience with the practice). Id. at 246 (testimony
of Herbert Denenberg) and at 683-90 (testimony of James Hunt, former Vermont Commissioner of Banking and Insurance
testifying for the National Insurance Consumer Organization). The late Senator Philip Hart, one of the most aggressive
congressional investigators of insurance practices, advocated a "truth-in-life-insurance" law. Cost Disclosure Hearings,
supra note 323, at 183 (1973 interview with Senator Hart).
421. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 150-51 and accompanying text.
423. An illustration of this problem can be found in the development of Blue Cross/Blue Shield. Such plans typically
were "community rated"-the rates were based on all insureds in the area rather than separate for each employer group.
Commercial insurers began to break into the market and rate groups individually so groups with smaller losses, that is,
groups with many young, healthy people, opted out of the Blues. This ultimately lead Blue CrossiBlue Shield to abandon
community rating. S. KIstwa.L & H. DuNENrR, supra note 108, at 53-54.
424. One insurance text says people frequently evade such laws by dropping the policies after registering their cars
or by registering their car in another state that does not require insurance. F. CRANE, supra note 58, at 117. He reports that
California found 15% of its drivers to be uninsured. Id. He also reports that Illinois, which does not mandate insurance,
had 85% of drivers insured. Id.
425. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 99.
426. Id.
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This suggests redistribution at least to group health and disability policies and perhaps
from a subsidy from general revenues. 427
B. Beyond the Existing Framework
As previously discussed, there have been numerous proposals to enhance the
workings of the market with increased information to help insureds compare products
and negotiate with insurers. The institutionalists ask whether real people, as opposed
to theoretical ones, will process adequate information, not only to decide between
companies but also to decide what they should buy.428
Generally, few proposals have called for a government role in enhancing con-
sumer information about rational insurance buying. 429 The government could provide
more information about the actual incidence of potential risks and the availability of
types of insurance that address them, as well as their relative payoffs. 430
An institutionalist also might urge us to consider accepting bounds on rationality
and limiting choice. Perhaps important kinds of insurance should be mandated. 431
Perhaps insurance products as well as disclosure should be standardized. 432 Perhaps
the payoffs on some so-called "junk" coverages are so low that they should be
banned from the marketplace. 433
Given the inherent problems in the market, reform proposals beyond those
directed toward improving the market should be considered. There may be alternative
structures that could reduce transaction costs and reduce possibilities for opportunism
while preserving desirable loss control incentives. No-fault proposals shift the
distribution of risk but retain the private insurance market. 434 It has been proposed
that the cost of automobile accidents might be spread more cheaply, perhaps more
fairly, and with better deterrent incentives by a tax on gasoline or tires. 435 Funding
catastrophic health insurance through a tax on alcohol and cigarettes has been
suggested as well. 436
Evaluation of economic efficiency should be considered as a factor in the
cost-shifting of insurance that goes beyond the insurance pool. One should consider
where the expenses of uninsured and underinsured persons are allocated. 437 Much of
that cost is redistributed through mechanisms other than insurance. 438
427. A federal proposal in the last Congress would have required states to establish residual market mechanisms for
individual health insurance with rates to 150% of private market rates. Rich, Hill Panels Seek to Improve Health Care
for Poor, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1986, A13, col. 2. Because the proposal requires that the excess be made up by employers
of 20 or more employees, the cost is redistributed more broadly.
428. See supra notes 294-320 and accompanying text.
429. An exception is proposals discussed generally in Kunreuther, supra note 25, at 250-54.
430. Id. at 251-52, discusses this possibility with regard to flood and earthquake insurance.
431. Id. at 252-54 (disaster insurance).
432. See supra notes 321-29 and accompanying text.
433. A. ToatAs, supra note 240, at 73-74, reports that New York, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts have banned or severely restricted the sale of cancer insurance.
434. See supra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
435. A. Toarts, supra note 240, at 197-204 (1982) (tax on gasoline); Vickrey, supra note 15, at 471-75 (tax on
gasoline or tires).
436. Zook, supra note 357, at 79-80.
437. See supra notes 333-38 and accompanying text.
438. See, e.g., supra note 335 and accompanying text.
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Availability of insurance should be debated more squarely. Elsewhere I have
argued that a nationwide study of availability gaps be made in order to spur a public
debate on whether there are people society is willing to tolerate being uninsured and
how broadly the risk of particular losses should be shared. 439
VI. CONCLUSION
A paradox exists between the general and the specific in thinking about
insurance problems. The usual concentration on specific lines of insurance and, in
classification, on particular classifiers limits the likelihood of conceptual thinking.440
Bringing economics to bear on the law encourages theoretical thinking as well as
providing specific insights about possible outcomes of particular legal rules and
potential unintended consequences.
At the same time, before specific reforms are adopted or rejected, policy
advocates and policy makers must consider the world that exists as well as the
theoretical one. For insurance, this means considering the reality of the market and
the limits to its perfection. A paragraph ago I criticized thinking based on insurance
lines. Still before solutions are adopted, their probable functioning must be
considered in the context of specific lines of insurance.
Insurance classification raises questions about who should bear the risk of
crucial functions in our society. It deserves analysis free from cant and open to
imaginative consideration of alternatives. Past public policy debate has been too
narrowly focused. It begins by assuming a private insurance model and limits the
debate to whether we should tinker with classification discretion. Proposals to
enhance competition usually are made only within the framework of existing types of
insurance and their markets.
Instead, from time to time we should lift our eyes from examining the past and
the status quo and consider the functions insurance is supposed to serve in our
society. Economic theory has much to offer in predicting unintended consequences
that could result from various arrangements and reform proposals designed to perform
or encourage performance of these functions. At the same time, before deciding what
public policy should be on classification and other insurance regulation matters, we
ought to return to the complex reality of how people actually behave, the web of laws
and regulations already in place, and the limits to perfecting information in a business
founded on predicting the unpredictable.
439. Wortham, supra note 1, at 420-21.
440. K. ABeAHsm, supra note 15, at 64, makes this point. His excellent book is one of the few exceptions.
[Vol. 47:835
